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I. INTRODUCTION 
Progressive religious causes have grown increasingly visible during 
the Trump presidency.1  Dr. Scott Warren, volunteering with a Unitarian 
ministry, is arrested for giving food and water to border crossers in 
Arizona and charged with felony harboring.2  Catholic nuns in 
Pennsylvania try to stop the installation of a natural gas pipeline across 
their land.3  Bishop Daniel Flores of the Diocese of Brownsville, Texas 
refuses to allow federal agents to build part of the border wall on church 
property.4  The Standing Rock Sioux and Cheyenne Tribes try to prevent 
the routing of an oil pipeline through sacred water in North Dakota.5  A 
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 1. See Tom Gjelten, Provoked by Trump, the Religious Left Is Finding Its Voice, NPR (Jan. 24, 
2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/24/684435743/provoked-by-trump-the-religious-left-
is-finding-its-voice [https://perma.cc/VQ9C-FGHJ] (“Religious voters on the left . . . are finding a 
new determination to defend the values of their faith, as they understand them.”); see also discussion 
infra Part IV. 
 2. Miriam Jordan, An Arizona Teacher Helped Migrants. Jurors Couldn’t Decide If It Was a 
Crime., N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/us/scott-warren-arizona-
deaths.html [https://perma.cc/8GTC-7BDL]; see discussion infra notes 427–45 and accompanying 
text.   
 3. Eliza Griswold, The Renegade Nuns Who Took on a Pipeline, NEW YORKER (Apr. 10, 
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/on-religion/the-renegade-nuns-who-took-on-a-pipeline 
[https://perma.cc/VB2V-35ZZ]. 
 4. Bernadette Mary Reis, Diocese in Texas Prepares to Protect Its Land, VATICAN NEWS 
(Nov. 5, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.vaticannews.va/en/church/news/2018-11/brownsville-texas-
daniel-flores-survey-right-wall-federal-court.html [https://perma.cc/39UQ-QZ4F]; see discussion 
infra notes 390–410 and accompanying text. 
 5. Stephanie Keith, Out of the Spotlight, Tribes Keep Fighting Dakota Pipeline, REUTERS 
(Aug. 2, 2018, 6:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-south-dakota-native-americans/out-of-
spotlight-tribes-keep-fighting-dakota-pipeline-idUSKBN1KN1HT [https://perma.cc/NCC8-KR9C]; 
see discussion infra notes 473–500 and accompanying text. 
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thousand churches offer sanctuary to the undocumented,6 and countless 
churches shelter the homeless and feed the poor, sometimes in violation 
of local ordinances.7  The Plowshares Seven are convicted of trespassing 
on a naval base for a religious protest of nuclear weapons.8  A thousand 
congregations install solar panels to be good stewards of God’s creation.9  
A bishop escorts asylum-seekers across the border in protest of federal 
policies.10  Religious communities of all sorts champion efforts to protect 
religious, racial, and other underrepresented groups.  In many of these 
situations, religious people and entities exercising their faith come into 
conflict with law.  They typically seek the remedy of a religious 
exemption. 
Perhaps these examples seem surprising, as they involve conflicts 
between legal regimes and religious people committed to addressing 
issues of poverty, immigration, war, climate change, and the like.  Over 
the last few decades we have grown accustomed to identifying religious 
freedom claims with conservative causes,11 like employers refusing to 
provide employee insurance coverage for contraceptives,12 a baker 
refusing to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple,13 a church-
affiliated adoption service refusing to place a child with a same-sex 
couple,14 and religiously affiliated hospitals refusing to provide gender 
 
 6. Duarte Geraldino & Frank Carlson, More Churches Are Opening Their Doors to 
Undocumented Immigrants Facing Deportation (Jan. 15, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.pbs.org/news 
hour/show/more-churches-are-opening-their-doors-to-undocumented-immigrants-facing-deportation 
[https://perma.cc/EJA9-BS2R]. 
 7. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Pitts, Dundalk Church Faces Fine for Hosting Homeless, BALT. SUN 
(Dec. 12, 2016, 9:39 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-county/bs-md-
church-homeless-fine-20161212-story.html [https://perma.cc/4GQR-D94K].   
 8. Jesse Remedios, Kings Bay Plowshares Activists Found Guilty of All Charges, NAT’L 
CATH. REP. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/kings-bay-plowshares-activists-
found-guilty-all-charges [https://perma.cc/C4X6-6US2].  
 9. Jeff Brumley, Churches Overcome Attitudes, and Sometimes the Law, to Go Solar, BAPTIST 
NEWS GLOB. (Dec. 11, 2018), https://baptistnews.com/article/churches-overcome-attitudes-and-
sometimes-the-law-to-go-solar/ [https://perma.cc/FT6D-EYWU]. 
 10. Shannon Mason, Texas Bishop Escorts Migrants Across the Border in Protest of U.S. 
Policy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 28, 2019, 12:07 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ 
ny-texas-bishop-escorts-migrants-border-protest-20190628-g62a7k4iojbkbkaihi2urcyydi-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/P49Y-RC92]. 
 11. See Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 163, 164 (2016) (noting that high notoriety cases like “Hobby Lobby and Elane 
Photography . . . have become the face of free exercise to the general public”). 
 12. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 701–02 (2014). 
 13. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 
(2018). 
 14. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-
123, 2020 WL 871694 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020) (mem.). 
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confirmation surgery15 and physician-assisted suicide.16  These types of 
refusals to accept the moral standards of contemporary secularism have 
dominated the free exercise exemption space for years.  And it has 
generated backlash.  After a series of Supreme Court decisions highly 
protective of free exercise, as well as controversial state measures 
intended to broaden exemptions for conservative causes, secular liberals 
began to argue for far narrower religious exemptions in light of third-
party harms and discriminatory impacts on women and the LGBTQ 
community.17  Some began to question even the value of religious 
freedom.18  Indeed, after decades of the culture wars, this identification 
of religious freedom with conservative causes has hardened along party 
lines.  Democratic Senators have explicitly criticized the conservative 
faith of judicial nominees.19  And in May 2019, a Democratic-majority 
House of Representatives passed the Equality Act, which protects 
persons from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
 
 15. See Minton v. Dignity Health, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 619 (Ct. App. 2019). 
 16. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Mahoney v. Centura Health Corp., No. 
2019CV031980 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2019), 2019 WL 6456775. 
 17. See generally Douglas Nejaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based 
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015) (highlighting the ways in 
which accommodation affects third parties); Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 
NW. U. L. REV. 929 (2018) (identifying healthcare as an institution that expands to adopt religious 
identities through mergers and acquisitions, even though many of those institutions no longer have 
religious ties); Leslie C. Griffin, A Word of Warning from a Woman: Arbitrary, Categorical, and 
Hidden Religious Exemptions Threaten LGBT Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 97 (2015) 
(arguing that religious exemptions threaten to erode LGBTQ rights); Thomas C. Berg, Progressive 
Arguments for Religious Organizational Freedom: Reflections on the HHS Mandate, 21 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279, 284 (2013) [hereinafter Berg, Progressive Arguments] (“As the HHS 
mandate dramatizes, there is an increasingly strong impulse, especially on the left, to limit the free 
exercise of religious institutions to the narrow confines of the house of worship.”). 
 18. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 
869–77 (2014) [hereinafter Laycock, Culture Wars] (“The academic arguments against religious 
liberty grow more elaborate in the law reviews, more hostile in the list serves.”). 
 19. See, e.g., Patrick L. Gregory, Senators Spar on Religious Questions at Trump Judge Pick 
Hearing, BLOOMBERG L. (June 5, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week 
/senators-spar-on-religion-questions-at-trump-judge-pick-hearing [https://perma.cc/93JD-FK8F] 
(discussing Senators Kamala Harris and Mazie Hirono’s criticism of judicial nominee Brian 
Buescher and noting that Senator Hirono stated “[n]o Democratic senator has suggested that 
membership in an organization makes a nominee unfit for the bench, only those who can’t be fair or 
impartial”); C.C. Pecknold, Democrats Find Another Religious Heretic, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 13, 
2017, 1:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-find-another-religious-heretic-1505323653 
[https://perma.cc/A9W4-M67S] (stating several Democratic senators implied “not that you couldn’t 
be a Catholic and uphold the law, but that you couldn’t be an orthodox Catholic and do so”); Emma 
Green, Bernie Sanders’s Religious Test for Christians in Public Office, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/06/bernie-sanders-chris-van-hollen-russell-vought 
/529614/ [https://perma.cc/6HXV-J7RP] (noting Senator Bernie Sanders “questioned the faith” of 
Russell Vought, the nominee for deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget).  
538 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
identity.20  The Act contains no religious exemptions and explicitly 
provides that no court can mandate one under federal law.21 
The sheer existence of increasingly visible progressive religion 
disrupts the entrenched polarized narratives of “religious conservatives” 
and “secular liberals.”22  “Religious liberals” or “religious progressives,” 
as I will call them interchangeably, are living proof that religious 
freedom entails far more than refusing to bend to current sexual and 
reproductive norms.23  Throughout American history, religious 
progressives have been center stage in major moral, political, and legal 
movements: abolition, social gospel, unionization and workers’ rights, 
civil rights, just war, and protections for religious and racial minorities.  
Religious liberals have used the power of protest and persuasion, 
education at the grass roots level, and advocacy in courts, legislatures, 
and agencies to effect change.  They have also sought exemptions in 
courts, legislatures, and agencies for causes as varied as conscientious 
objection to war and sanctuary for the undocumented.  Many religious 
groups and coalitions now work to address issues of environmental 
protection, nativism and racism, poverty, criminal justice, death penalty, 
immigration reform and sanctuary, trafficking, war, and torture.24  They 




 20. Equality Act, H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 21. Id. § 1106.  The bill states that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) is not 
applicable to it.  Id.  § 1107.  Additionally, in 2018 (and again in 2019) Democrats in the House and 
Senate proposed the Do No Harm Act, which carves out sexual orientation, gender identity, and 
abortion from RFRA protection.  H.R. 1450, 116th Cong. (2019); S. 593, 116th Cong. (2019).  
Currently under consideration in the House, the Do No Harm Act would amend the RFRA itself, 
making it not applicable when a third party is burdened.  H.R. 1450, § 2.  For a discussion of RFRA, 
see Section II.A.  
 22. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS LEFT AND CHURCH STATE RELATIONS 97–109 
(2009) (arguing that secular liberals should support religious freedom because religious liberals 
support many secular liberal causes and explaining that the secular-liberal suspicion of religious 
freedom only makes them look hostile toward religion and undermines liberal political causes).  
 23. See Lund, supra note 11, at 164–65. 
 24. See generally MELISSA ROGERS, FAITH IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (2019) (addressing 
attacks, hostility, and threats directed at religious minorities).  Also note the work of the Religious 
Liberty Committee, originally of the National Council of Churches and now sponsored by the 
Religious Freedom Center of the Newseum Institute, which for nearly sixty years has convened 
meetings of lawyers from numerous religious denominations across the political spectrum to discuss 
issues on multiple church-state topics and to create opportunities for collaboration in many areas of 
public policy.  See The Committee on Religious Liberty, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CTR., 
https://www.religiousfreedomcenter.org/about/crl/ [https://perma.cc/3E5P-2T4F] (last visited Mar. 5, 
2020).  
 25. See ROGERS, supra note 24, at 199; Lund, supra note 11, at 164 (“The majority of RFRA 
and state RFRA cases have little to do with discrimination or sexual morality or the culture wars.”). 
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in the Trump era: 
Frustrated by Christian conservatives’ focus on reversing liberal 
successes in legalizing abortion and same-sex marriage, those on the 
religious left want to turn instead to what they see as truly fundamental 
biblical imperatives—caring for the poor, welcoming strangers and 
protecting the earth—and maybe even change some minds about what 
it means to be a believer.26 
But the story is not so simple as the dispute between pro-exemption 
religious conservatives and anti-exemption secular liberals, with 
religious liberals now seeking exemptions.  A deep tradition exists 
among many religious progressives that shares the secular liberal 
concern over the disadvantages and inequities that can flow from an 
overzealous accommodation of religion.27  Although they have long 
supported free exercise, religious liberals view some of the conservative 
arguments as so extreme that they endanger religious liberty more 
broadly.28  In fact, they resist the particular type of “robust” free exercise 
advocacy of the conservative narrative out of concern that it “tarnish[es] 
their own faith, or religion in general, by association.”29  Yet the 
resurgence of progressive religious claims, together with a lack of 
coordination and uniform messaging, presents the exemption question in 
fresh ways.  This litigation is sure to confound expectations on all 
sides.30 
 
 26. Laurie Goodstein, Religious Liberals Sat Out of Politics for 40 Years. Now They Want in 
the Game., N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/us/politics/politics-
religion-liberal-william-barber.html [https://perma.cc/XV7B-NUUZ]. 
 27. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 925, 927–28 (2000) (“[R]eligious practices should receive the same kind of 
constitutional protection afforded to expression and association under the Speech and Equal 
Protection Clauses.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions From 
the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 343, 372–83 (2014) (arguing that the material cost shifting entailed by RFRA exemptions 
violates the Establishment Clause).  But see Berg, Progressive Arguments, supra note 17, at 298 
(“[I]t is ironic and mistaken for progressives to deny or minimize religious-freedom protection for 
faith-based service organizations . . . .  Works of justice, mercy, and service lie at the core of many 
religious faiths, but especially those that describe themselves as ‘progressive.’”). 
 28. See, e.g., Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 18, at 840.  
 29. Berg, Progressive Arguments, supra note 17, at 331; see also Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, 
We’re Less and Less a Christian Nation, and I Blame Some Blowhards, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/26/opinion/sunday/christianity-united-states.html [https://perma.c 
c/F4MS-U6WE] (stating that Gregory Smith of the Pew Research Center noted “the data seem[s] 
consistent” with scholarly claims “that young adults have turned away from organized religion 
because they are repulsed by its entanglements with conservative politics”). 
 30. For a discussion of liberal religious liberty claims, broadly defined, see ELIZABETH REINER 
PLATT ET AL., COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, LAW, RIGHTS, & RELIGION PROJECT, WHOSE FAITH 
MATTERS? THE FIGHT FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY BEYOND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT (2019), 
 
540 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
In this Article, I use the labels “conservative” and “liberal,” 
“traditional” and “progressive” to describe religious beliefs, practices, 
individuals, communities, and traditions.  As a general matter, I denote 
as “liberal” religiously motivated service on behalf of the poor, the 
immigrant and refugee, and the environment.31  But I use this 
terminology with great reluctance, not only because it can be 
underinclusive, overinclusive, or otherwise inaccurate in a given case but 
especially because it further politicizes faith.  Most religious traditions 
have moral and social teachings that long pre-date and span the polarized 
divide of current U.S. politics; they typically caution against partisan 
alignment.  Catholic leaders have been staunchly conservative on culture 
war issues but are quite progressive on immigration matters.  And, of 
course, shifting alliances often occur, as we see some conservative 
communities begin to rethink environmental stewardship.  Moreover, 
love of neighbor can be manifested in endless and surprising ways, 
unbounded by political categories.  Nevertheless, given the political 
realities of these last forty years, with both church and state reinforcing a 
nationwide polarization,32 the conservative-liberal chasm is now so deep 
that I use the terms descriptively, though not normatively. 
This Article offers several significant observations.  First, it 
describes the distinctive ways in which conservative and liberal claims 
“present” in litigation.  Next, it uncovers some inequities in the way 
these claims are addressed, with liberal claims sometimes at a 
disadvantage.  Finally, it notes that despite these vulnerabilities, liberal 
claims are more likely to be protected when their religious exercise 
occurs on private property. 
A. The Distinction Between Refusal and Affirmative Claims 
This Article divides free exercise claims into two categories: refusal 
and affirmative.  Refusal claims arise when a law or government policy 
mandates a person to act in ways that are contrary to her faith, and she 
 
https://lawrightsreligion.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/Images/Whose%20Faith%20M
atters%20Full%20Report%2012.12.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A6Q-3H8R] [hereinafter WHOSE 
FAITH MATTERS?].  
 31. I use the terms to describe acts and not necessarily entire religious communities, for many 
conservative churches serve the poor and many liberal churches that support a pro-choice legal 
system are ethically pro-life. 
 32. See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, Constitutional Contraction: Religion and the Roberts Court, 
26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 385, 396 (2015) (noting the Supreme Court has grown more polarized, as 
seen by “a reduction in the range of voting patterns in law and religion cases,” with “[t]he votes of 
the Justices over the last decade in law and religion cases overwhelmingly reflecting only two 
distributional patterns: unanimity or a 5–4 split” along liberal-conservative lines). 
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refuses to comply.  Most conservative free exercise claims today are 
refusal claims: a health care law requires a religious employer to provide 
contraception insurance coverage, and he refuses to comply on religious 
grounds,33 or a public accommodations law requires a florist to provide 
floral arrangements for a gay couple’s wedding, and she refuses to 
comply on religious grounds.34  But there is nothing inherently 
conservative about refusal claims.  They dominate in culture war 
litigation only because the objectionable mandates were enacted by 
politically liberal legislatures and agencies.  In fact, the oldest refusal 
claim—military conscientious objection—is widely identified as a liberal 
objection, particularly since the Vietnam era.35 
Refusal claims originate with the law because they are provoked by a 
law.  In contrast, affirmative claims involve religious exercise that 
originates with the claimant’s faith.  A religious person or entity engages 
in conduct in accordance with faith, but the conduct is met with legal 
restraint—a law prohibiting or curtailing that religious exercise.36  Most 
liberal free exercise claims are affirmative claims: a church desires to 
establish a program to shelter the homeless but zoning laws prevent it;37 
an individual helps a refugee and is arrested for criminal harboring of an 
undocumented person.38  In such situations, the law does not mandate an 
act that conflicts with religion, but rather restrains a religious act. 
There is nothing inherently liberal about affirmative claims.  It just 
so happens that in our current day, efforts to help the poor, the 
 
 33. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 703 (2014). 
 34. State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 19-333 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019).  Note that I separate refusal claims into two categories: 
participation and endorsement.  Angela C. Carmella, When Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious 
Reasons: Drawing Lines Between “Participation” and “Endorsement” in Claims of Moral 
Complicity, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1593, 1596 (2017). 
 35. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Evolving Christian Attitudes Towards Personal and National 
Self-Defense, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1709, 1741–43 (2013). 
 36. For refusal claims, the law requires an action of the religious party.  For affirmative claims, 
the religion propels the action that the law restrains.  In the former, the government is the assertive 
party.  In the latter, the religious party is assertive.  Note that either type of claim can be brought 
against laws that are generally applicable and facially neutral.  A religious party might refuse to 
follow a neutral general requirement or might challenge a neutral general restraint on its religious 
exercise.  If the government mandates or restrains in a way that targets only religious actors or 
conduct, that is likely a Free Exercise violation under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). 
 37. See, e.g., Pitts, supra note 7.  
 38. See Teo Armus, After Helping Migrants in the Arizona Desert, an Activist Was Charged 
with a Felony. Now, He’s Been Acquitted, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2019, 6:03 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/21/arizona-activist-scott-warren-acquitted-charges 
-helping-migrants-cross-border/ [https://perma.cc/A6DQ-ASDP].  For a discussion of Dr. Scott 
Warren’s case, see infra notes 427–45 and accompanying text. 
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immigrant, and the environment all take place in a heavily regulated 
environment.  Indeed, although religious freedom claims now often fall 
along partisan lines, there are plenty of examples of liberal refusal claims 
and conservative affirmative claims.  For instance, in response to a 
Minnesota law that required churches to allow guns in their parking lots, 
a liberal church refused to comply and challenged the mandate.39  In 
contrast, a conservative church brought an affirmative claim in response 
to a Georgia law that made it a misdemeanor to carry a gun into a place 
of worship.40  The church sought an exemption so that its members could 
carry guns for security during services.41 
To understand the scope of affirmative claims requires a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between religious traditions and the 
exercise of faith.  We often think about religion as expressions of 
specific commands, perhaps with rules governing even the details of 
daily life.  But other religious commands are general: love your 
neighbor, serve the poor, welcome the stranger, care for creation.  In this 
context, it is up to specific religious individuals and communities, using 
the hermeneutics of their texts, the ceremonies of their ancestors, or 
examination of conscience, to decide the ways in which these commands 
will be manifested and expressed, that is, how their faith will be 
inculturated.42  How one serves the poor or welcomes the stranger or 
cares for creation will be guided by theological principles and the 
particularities of time, place, history, and circumstances, which means 
that most religious acts are not fixed at all times and all places but are 
inherently fluid, indeterminate, contextualized, and discretionary.  These 
types of indeterminate religious acts are “affirmative” acts.  Any given 
act might be legally permissible in certain circumstances, but unlawful in 
others.43  For instance, Dr. Scott Warren’s humanitarian outreach may 
 
 39. Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 198–99 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).  
The church’s refusal claim prevailed when the state appellate court found that the law substantially 
burdened religion by forcing churches “to act in a manner that is inconsistent with their religious 
beliefs” in violation of the state’s constitution.  Id. at 204–05.  
 40. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 41. Id. at 1249.  The Eleventh Circuit denied this affirmative claim, finding the desire to carry a 
gun to be a personal preference, and not to involve religion.  Id. at 1258. 
 42. While the term “inculturate” is often used in the context of missionary work, it is also used 
more generally to mean the way in which religious beliefs become incarnate in a given culture.  That 
is how it is used in this Article.  See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BEVANS, MODELS OF CONTEXTUAL 
THEOLOGY 26–27 (rev. & expanded ed. 2002); INT’L THEOLOGICAL COMM’N, FAITH AND 
INCULTURATION (1988), http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_ 
cti_1988_fede-inculturazione_en.html [https://perma.cc/F7LF-G5ST].   
 43. This Article focuses on individual acts because the law restrains specific religious conduct.  
Faith is obviously far more than a sum of these actions. 
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have been allowed in many places and under many conditions, but when 
given to undocumented migrants under a harsh federal policy, 
prosecutors treated the humanitarian outreach as a felony.44 
To say that religious exercise is indeterminate or discretionary is not 
to say that it is undertaken lightly, or by mere whim or preference.  In 
many cases, the religious individual experiences her “choice” as deeply 
as those whose faith mandates highly particularized rules and 
requirements.  Dr. Warren believed that he had no choice but to aid 
individuals who crossed the border.45  And even when alternatives exist, 
choosing the means by which to exercise faith remains a theological 
determination that rests with the religious actor.  The Supreme Court has 
said as much when it defers to religious claimants’ judgment on the 
exercise of their religious convictions.46 
Refusal claims are narrower than affirmative claims because they 
directly respond to a particular legal mandate: Do this; no, I will not.  
The law requires a person to act in a way that violates some religious 
tenet.  Religion appears in these situations to be unassailably rule-based: 
thou shall not be involved in abortion, same-sex marriage, war, and the 
like.  While refusal claims are generated by what the law requires, 
affirmative claims are guided instead by what a religion teaches.  Faith, 
not the state, says, “Do this.”  Thus, affirmative claims, as their name 
suggests, are immensely wide ranging. 
B. What the Distinction Uncovers: Affirmative Claims Face More 
Doctrinal Obstacles 
In contrast to refusal claims, affirmative claims face doctrinal 
obstacles wherever strict scrutiny regimes are applicable, such as under 
federal or state statutes.  In particular, it may be harder to establish a 
 
 44. Federal prosecutors charged Dr. Warren with two felony harboring charges after authorities 
raided an Ajo migrant aid station in January 2018.  Five months after a jury deadlocked on the 
charges against him, however, Dr. Warren received a not guilty verdict in his retrial on November 
21, 2019.  Bobby Allyn, Jury Acquits Aid Worker Accused of Helping Border-Crossing Migrants in 
Arizona, NPR (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/21/781658800/jury-acquits-aid-
worker-accused-of-helping-border-crossing-migrants-in-arizona [https://perma.cc/K4HL-QH2K]. 
 45. Paul Ingram, No More Deaths Volunteer Testifies Leaving Water for Migrants Is a ‘Sacred 
Act,’ TUCSON SENTINEL (May 7, 2019, 2:45 AM), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com 
/local/report/050719_warren_trial/no-more-deaths-volunteer-testifes-leaving-water-migrants-sacred-
act/ [https://perma.cc/2MDF-E3S3] [hereinafter Ingam, No More Deaths Volunteer Testifies]. 
 46. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) (“Thomas drew a line, and it is not 
for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.”); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 724 (2014) (framing the proper RFRA issue as “whether the HHS 
mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct business in 
accordance with their religious beliefs”). 
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substantial burden on religious exercise for an affirmative claim—
perhaps because there is no government coercion or because there are 
alternative ways to exercise one’s faith.  For some courts, the existence 
of alternatives might be dispositive.  Courts that ask whether the 
religious claimant could have chosen a different way to serve the poor or 
protect the undocumented may find no conflict between law and faith, 
and thus no burden.  Moreover, affirmative claims are at the mercy of 
multiple tests for identifying a substantial burden, which vary from 
circuit to circuit and state to state.  Refusal claims typically do not suffer 
from such vulnerabilities at the substantial burden stage, since coercion 
is clearly met, and the direct conflict between the mandate and religious 
refusal is clear.  Thus, while success is never assured, affirmative 
claimants—now predominantly progressive causes—may face a more 
difficult road. 
C. Affirmative Claims on Private Property Fare Better Than on Public 
Property 
Even with these obstacles, affirmative claims may fare better when 
religious exercise is conducted on private property, as when liberal 
churches seek to serve the poor and care for the environment on their 
own property.  Those actions are anchored by the protection of 
ownership, which is missing when ceremonies and ministries are 
conducted on publicly owned lands.  The protections for religious 
conduct on public property depend upon a variety of constitutional 
doctrines that may or may not apply. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part II describes the 
development of the conservative religious liberty narrative, with its 
predominance of refusal claims, as reinforced most recently by the 
Trump administration.  Part III explores the role of religious liberals in 
promoting progressive causes over the last fifty years and leading up to 
the 2016 election.  Part IV describes the current progressive religious 
freedom litigation and the interpretive obstacles. 
This Article does not intend to suggest that religious liberals should 
organize and model their litigation strategies after religious conservatives 
or try to out-compete them to win broad exemptions.  Such a strategy has 
dangers of its own.47  Nevertheless, the unmitigated presence of 
 
 47. I have written elsewhere of the dangers of “endless litigation,” which tempts litigants to 
make extreme arguments, invites government aggression, and threatens collaborative efforts on 
shared social goals.  See Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses 
and Political-Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2017) [hereinafter Carmella, Catholic 
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progressive litigants now in the free exercise space begins to challenge 
the entrenched conservative and liberal narratives regarding the meaning 
and scope of religious freedom.  It raises a different set of moral 
concerns for public discourse and may offer different views of the 
purpose and value of religious freedom.  It challenges the narrow 
conception of rule-based religion with claims that often involve religious 
indeterminacy and fluidity.  Further, the rise in visibility of liberal 
religious claims serves as a reminder that progressives, like 
traditionalists, can find themselves out of step with majority norms and 
dependent upon the continued salience and endurance of private 
institutional and associational freedoms.  It forces a reconsideration of 
the notion of complicity, which has been tied so closely to the 
conservative narrative.  For all these reasons, the hodgepodge of 
progressive litigants can contribute significantly to an ever-evolving 
political and juridical compromise among multiple religious freedom 
narratives. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE NARRATIVE 
The modern constitutional understanding of religious freedom entails 
a double immunity, encompassing “immunity from both coercion and 
restraint.”48  These two immunities present differently, as refusal claims 
and affirmative claims, respectively.  The first immunity provides that 
government cannot force one to act in a manner contrary to faith.  Here, a 
religious actor will bring a refusal claim, objecting to the law that 
requires conduct in conflict with her faith.  The second immunity 
provides that government cannot restrain one from acting in accordance 
with faith.  In such a case, a religious actor will bring an affirmative 
claim, seeking freedom to do what the law forbids.49  In either case, the 
typical remedy sought is an exemption. 
The modern free exercise jurisprudence, fully embracing this double 
immunity, was squarely set to protect religious minorities.  But by the 
 
Institutions].  Additionally, “the rush to litigate takes a toll on [a church’s] identity as a religious-
moral community, as its public presence begins to mirror that of any political actor.  The loss of 
distinctive public characteristics of a moral community risks narrowing some of the very 
constitutional and statutory protections it seeks.”  Id. at 8. 
 48. Angela C. Carmella, John Courtney Murray, S.J. (1904–1967), in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF 
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE 115, 128 (John Witte Jr. & Frank 
Alexander eds., 2006). 
 49. Of course, legal restraints also involve coercion.  Both coercion and restraint involve legal 
penalties for failing to comply with the law, and so fulfill the threshold requirement of coercion for a 
free exercise claim as set out in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 
448 (1988). 
546 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
1970s and 1980s, as the culture wars began to politicize and polarize 
religious communities into traditionalist and progressive camps, 
conservative churches tried to stem the tide of changing sexual mores 
and, when that failed, to seek exemptions.  The exemptions—judicial, 
legislative, and regulatory—have been based on refusal claims.  The 
Trump administration has explicitly reinforced the notion that religious 
freedom is primarily about protecting traditionalists from the 
encroachment of liberal mores on sexuality and family matters.50 
A. The Beginnings of Modern Free Exercise: The Protection of 
Religious Minorities 
Today’s polarized narratives between religious conservatives and 
secular liberals differ from earlier narratives about religious freedom.  
From 1963 until the early 2000s, the predominant narrative was a liberal 
one: that broad free exercise protections were necessary to protect 
minority faiths.51  In the first Warren Court interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause, liberal Justice Brennan announced that religious claims 
would enjoy a strict scrutiny standard of review.52 
In Sherbert v. Verner, South Carolina denied unemployment 
compensation to Adele Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, who was fired 
for refusing to work on Saturdays, her sabbath.53  Because there were 
jobs in her field available on Saturdays, the state deemed her religious 
reason for refusing them inappropriate.54  The Supreme Court held that 
the state could not condition a government benefit on giving up one’s 
religious practice without a compelling justification, and that no such 
 
 50. See William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General William P. Barr 
Delivers Remarks to the Law School and the de Nicola Center for Ethics and Culture at the 
University of Notre Dame (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
william-p-barr-delivers-remarks-law-school-and-de-nicola-center-ethics [https://perma.cc/6SV7-
8ZVX]; see also Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Sessions Delivers 
Remarks at the Department of Justice’s Religious Liberty Summit (July 30, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-department-justice-s 
-religious-liberty-summit [https://perma.cc/B4HD-84DD]. 
 51. At the same time, the Supreme Court also protected religious minorities through its 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.  For instance, the Court struck school prayer in Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Bible reading in Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), as well 
as in-school religious instruction in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 
(1948).  This gave considerable freedom to religious minorities and those of no faith, who had been 
in school environments where these “voluntary” practices were psychologically coercive and 
intimidating. 
 52. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 53. Id. at 399. 
 54. Id. at 399–401. 
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justification existed here.55  The Court noted that while majoritarian 
faiths (i.e., most Christians) could be easily accommodated by 
legislatures, minority faiths were less likely to get the attention of the 
political branches.56  Indeed, South Carolina had already accommodated 
Sunday worshippers by statute, ensuring they would never be put in the 
situation faced by a Sabbatarian like Adele Sherbert.57  The minority 
protection narrative was further enshrined in Wisconsin v. Yoder, a 
unanimous decision of the Burger Court that exempted Amish teenagers 
from compulsory high school attendance lest the worldly values learned 
in school threaten the survival of their community and faith.58 
Sherbert and Yoder presented the issues as refusal claims.  The 
Amish parents in Yoder refused to send their children to high school as 
was required by a compulsory education law.59  Sherbert involved an 
indirect refusal.  Obviously, no law mandated Adele Sherbert to work on 
Saturdays.60  But it was clear that if she practiced her religion and 
refused to work on Saturdays, she would not qualify for government 
benefits because her unemployment would not be legitimate.61  Given 
this penalty, the state action was tantamount to a law mandating Saturday 
work.62  The refusal paradigm thus involves claims not only against laws 
that order a particular act but also against laws that indirectly order a 
particular act by withholding government benefits.63 
The upshot of Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny was that religious 
claimants sought court-mandated exemptions from otherwise generally 
applicable laws.  The claimant was required to demonstrate that a law 
imposed a burden on her religious exercise; the government was required 
to show that the law was the least restrictive way of advancing a 
compelling interest.  Few claimants prevailed throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, as the Supreme Court routinely found government interests 
sufficiently compelling64 or deemed strict scrutiny inapplicable.65 
 
 55. Id. at 406–07. 
 56. See id. at 406. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972). 
 59. Id. at 207. 
 60. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (“[I]t is true that no criminal sanctions directly compel 
appellant to work a six-day week.”). 
 61. See id. at 404 (“[I]t [is] apparent that appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits derives 
solely from the practice of her religion . . . .”).  
 62. See id. 
 63. See discussion infra notes 191–97 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (finding a compelling interest in 
enforcing social security tax obligations). 
 65. See, e.g., O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (prison policy preventing 
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In 1990, a conservative Supreme Court majority rejected strict 
scrutiny as unsustainable, and with it the minority protection narrative.66  
In Employment Division v. Smith, Justice Scalia wrote that an authentic 
application of strict scrutiny would yield religious exemptions for all 
manner of minority practices, which would dangerously threaten the 
stability of society and lead to anarchy.67  The Court therefore abandoned 
the strict scrutiny standard and narrowed the reading of the Free Exercise 
Clause to prohibit only government suppression and discrimination 
targeted at religion.68  This ended the practice of court-mandated 
protection from neutral, generally applicable laws that inadvertently 
burden a particular group.69  Aggrieved parties, said the Court, should 
seek protection from legislatures, not courts: 
[L]eaving accommodation to the political process will place at a 
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic 
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is 
a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all 
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.70 
In reaction to Smith, a broad coalition of religious and civil liberties 
groups and a massive bipartisan effort in Congress saved the strict 
scrutiny standard of review with two federal statutes.  The 1993 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) reinstated strict scrutiny as a 
statutory cause of action.71  Testimony at the congressional hearings 
overwhelmingly noted the need to address the suffering of religious 
 
attendance at a weekly religious service); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1986) 
(military regulation preventing wearing a yarmulke while in uniform); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 
707 (1986) (statute requiring welfare applicants to provide social security numbers); Lyng v. Nw. 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988) (claims involving government 
administration of property). 
 66. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885–86 (1990).  At the same time, the Court 
continued to splinter on Establishment Clause interpretation, with conservatives more willing to 
accommodate church-state cooperation.  See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 
(2002) (vouchers for religious schools); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 
592–93 (2007) (funds for faith-based services); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 569–70 
(2014) (legislative prayer). 
 67. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
 68. See id. at 890. 
 69. Id. at 885.  Note, however, that Smith did not overrule Sherbert or Yoder.  Smith carved out 
areas in which strict scrutiny review still functions, such as individualized governmental assessments 
and hybrid constitutional claims.  Id. at 881–82. 
 70. Id. at 890. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2018).  The Act’s stated purpose was “to restore the compelling 
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.”  Id. § 2000bb(b) (citations 
omitted). 
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minorities.72  The language of the statute itself notes that even losses 
under the test mean only that courts are striking “sensible balances.”73  
After the Court held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the 
states in 1997,74 Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)75 with unanimous support in 
both the House and the Senate in 2000.76  The RLUIPA hearings again 
involved stories of restrictive land use laws and prison policies, and 
frequent discriminatory actions in both realms, leading to particularly 
severe burdens on minority faiths.77  RFRA currently applies to all 
federal law, and RLUIPA applies to state laws involving land use and 
prison administration.  The strict scrutiny tests are identical in these sister 
statutes.78  In addition to these federal efforts to turn back Smith, some 
states began to interpret their constitutions to require a strict scrutiny 
 
 72. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 32 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of Dallin H. Oaks, 
Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints) (“The worshippers 
who need protections are the oppressed minorities, not the influential constituent elements of the 
majority.”); id. at 144–45 (statement of Forest D. Montgomery, Counsel, National Association of 
Evangelicals) (“[G]overnment officials who were formerly under obligation to be reasonable and 
attempt, if possible, to accommodate religious practice, are now free to impose laws without any 
regard for the religious sensibilities of minorities.”); id. at 171–72 (statement of Nadine Strossen, 
President, ACLU) (“[I]t is particularly troubling that the Supreme Court showed such a callous view 
toward the religious rights, and, by analogy, other constitutional rights of the disempowered, the 
unpopular, the minority religious and racial groups, turning on its head our understanding that the 
primary purpose of the free exercise clause and other provisions of the Bill of Rights was precisely 
to protect those disempowered minorities.”); see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: 
Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 118 (1992) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Stephen 
Solarz, chief sponsor and author of RFRA) (“Justice Scalia . . . took the position that . . . 
accommodating the religious preferences of minority religions is a luxury which we cannot afford.  
It seems to me that religious liberty is, in fact, a fundamental American value, and that it is a 
necessity we cannot do without . . . .”). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2018). 
 74. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (declaring RFRA an invalid exercise of 
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power). 
 75. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5. 
 76. 146 CONG. REC. H7191 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of the Speaker pro tempore) 
(noting no objections in the House of Representatives); 146 CONG. REC. S7779 (daily ed. July 27, 
2000) (statement of the Presiding Officer) (noting no objections in the Senate). 
 77. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 (2005) (“Before enacting [RLUIPA], Congress 
documented, in hearings spanning three years, that ‘frivolous or arbitrary’ barriers impeded 
institutionalized persons’ religious exercise.”).  See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7774–76 (daily ed. July 
27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne 
v. Flores (Part III): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 37–45 (1999) (statement of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Director of Legal Affairs, 
Aleph Institute); Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores (Part II): Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 54–60 (1999) 
(statement of Donald W. Brooks, Reverend, Diocese of Tulsa, Oklahoma). 
 78. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2) (2018), with id. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
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standard of review for government burdens on religion, and others 
passed state-level RFRA-like laws to provide comparable protection.79 
Both RFRA and RLUIPA were broadly bipartisan and passed with 
virtually unanimous support.80  They were not viewed as favoring a 
particular political view but rather as ensuring the most robust religious 
freedom possible in a pluralistic and complex society.81  Further, in the 
early 2000s both political parties recognized and supported the 
significant work of religious groups at the local level—in their charitable 
services, stabilizing impacts, and community building.  A White House 
office that coordinates such efforts has been maintained by Republican 
and Democratic Presidents for over fifteen years.82 
In the last few decades, however, the cultural and legal narrative has 
become politicized along new lines.  The broadly bipartisan support for 
religious freedom generally and minority faiths in particular, which 
characterized Congress and many state courts and legislatures, has 
evaporated.83  Since conservatives can no longer count on traditionalist 
ethics on sex and the family being legislatively enshrined, they have 
actively sought judicial religious exemptions and have lobbied for state 
RFRA-like laws that would explicitly protect them from progressive 
laws regarding sexual orientation and reproductive rights.84  In turn, 
secular liberals and many religious liberals have grown distrustful of the 
very notion of free exercise exemptions.  Indeed, in 2016, the Chairman 
of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which Congress created to 
inform the development of civil rights policy, said that “[t]he phrases 
 
 79. See generally Lund, supra note 11.  
 80. Eugene Volokh, A Brief Political History of Religious Exemptions, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/21/a-brief-political-
history-of-religious-exemptions [https://perma.cc/3J8P-PQET]. 
 81. See id. 
 82. For a description of the programs established in the Bush and Obama White Houses, see 
White House Faith-Based & Community Initiative, GEORGE W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE, https://george 
wbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/government/fbci/president-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/CS6E-
TDCU] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); About the Office of Faith-Based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ 
ofbnp/about [https://perma.cc/3QSQ-PJVU] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
 83. Adam Sonfield, Learning from Experience: Where Religious Liberty Meets Reproductive 
Rights, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2016/learning-
experience-where-religious-liberty-meets-reproductive-rights [https://perma.cc/NH2C-PLQR]. 
 84. See id. (“[Conservatives] have argued . . . that laws meant to promote access to 
contraception or equal treatment of same-sex marriage . . . are unlawfully restricting the rights of 
certain Americans to live according to their religious beliefs.”); see also Dan Nowicki, Ind. Faces 
Uproar That Veto of Ariz. Bill Avoided, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2015, 6:06 PM), https 
://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/31/indiana-religious-freedom-law-uproar-avoided 
-arizona/70738948/ [https://perma.cc/CFX8-LN2N] (discussing Indiana’s “religious freedom” law, 
which was then the 20th state version of RFRA). 
2020] PROGRESSIVE RELIGION 551 
‘religious liberty’ and ‘religious freedom’ will stand for nothing except 
hypocrisy so long as they remain code words for discrimination, 
intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia, and Islamophobia, Christian 
supremacy or any form of intolerance.”85 
B. The Culture Wars: Forging a Linkage Between Religion and 
Conservative Causes and the Emergence of the “Refusal” Paradigm 
for Free Exercise 
Abortion, contraception, and LGBTQ rights have been the biggest 
issues of the culture wars.  Abortion, an immensely controversial 
political and legal topic since its legalization in 1973, has not been a 
major religious freedom issue since then because of extensive legislative 
conscience protections.  Federal and state laws enacted in the 1970s 
provide that no medical personnel or hospital refusing to provide or 
participate in an abortion on religious or moral grounds can be required 
to do so or be punished for refusing.86  These “conscience” or “refusal” 
clauses obviate the need for judicially mandated protections.87 
In the 1990s, contraception emerged as a culture war issue when 
states began to pass women’s equity laws, which required employers to 
provide insurance coverage for contraception.88  Although churches were 
exempt, nonexempt Catholic charitable agencies refused to provide the 
coverage and demanded exemptions in New York and California—
without success.89  Federal regulations promulgated in 2012 under the 
Affordable Care Act90 required most employers to provide insurance that 
guaranteed contraceptives to employees at no cost.91  The U.S. 
 
 85. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING 
NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES 29 (2016), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ 
docs/Peaceful-Coexistence-09-07-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BSX-GG9G]. 
 86. See Lucas Mlsna, Stem Cell Based Treatments and Novel Considerations for Conscience 
Clause Legislation, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 471, 476–81 (2011) (describing federal and state health 
care conscience laws). 
 87. But see discussion of new regulatory protections for conscience infra notes 176–81 and 
accompanying text. 
 88. Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 1, 2019), https:// 
www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/insurance-coverage-contraceptives [https://perma.cc/C2U 
A-YLED]. 
 89. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 108 (Cal. 2004); 
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 469 (N.Y. 2006).  
 90. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 26, 29, 30, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 91. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 
2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. 2590; 45 C.F.R. 147). 
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Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) crafted a workaround 
for religious nonprofits, under which they could opt out of the mandate 
and shift the coverage obligations to their insurers.92  In response, as 
outraged Catholic bishops and Evangelical Christian leaders decried 
what they saw as the Obama administration’s assault on religious liberty, 
over one hundred lawsuits were filed—about half by family-owned 
businesses refusing to provide the coverage and the remainder by 
religious nonprofits refusing to sign the workaround form.93  In Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court, on a 5–4 split, held that a closely 
held for-profit corporation could make a RFRA claim and granted an 
exemption to the owners of objecting businesses, the Hahn family, and 
the Green family.94  Applying RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard of review, 
the Court found that the rule substantially burdened the plaintiffs’ 
religious beliefs because “it would violate their religion to facilitate 
access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after 
[conception].”95  While the Court assumed the rule advanced a 
compelling interest, it considered the workaround developed for 
nonprofits a less restrictive alternative.96  The Court also heard the 
nonprofits’ argument in Zubik v. Burwell, but did not reach the merits of 
their refusal claim.97 
Throughout this same period, traditionalists also challenged laws 
permitting same-sex marriage.  Beginning in 2000, liberal states began to 
recognize same-sex civil unions,98 and some then recognized same-sex 
marriage.99  By 2015, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges held 
 
 92. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 698 (2014) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 
147.131(b) (2018); 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,874 (July 2, 2013)). 
 93. See Birth Control Mandate Lawsuits, NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, https://now.org/resource/ 
birth-control-mandate-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/97J7-WS2N] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020) (listing 
100 plaintiffs that have filed lawsuits in opposition to the contraception mandate). 
 94. 573 U.S. at 772. 
 95. Id. at 703, 719–20.  For those who believe that life begins at conception, contraceptive 
drugs and devices that operate post-conception are considered abortifacients.  Id. at 701. 
 96. Id. at 728. 
 97. 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016). 
 98. On July 1, 2000, Vermont became the first state to recognize civil unions between same-sex 
couples.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2012).  The Vermont legislature recognized same-sex civil 
unions in response to the Vermont Supreme Court ruling in Baker v. State, which held that same-sex 
couples are entitled, under the Vermont Constitution, to the same “common benefits and 
protections” extended to married couples.  744 A.2d 864, 875 (Vt. 1999). 
 99. On November 18, 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to allow same-sex marriage 
after its highest court ruled that the state “may [not] deny the protections, benefits and obligations 
conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex who wish to marry.”  Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
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that the entire nation must recognize same-sex marriage.100  During this 
period, Evangelical Christians, Catholics, and Latter-day Saints were 
actively involved in political efforts to stem this tide.101  After 
Obergefell, they actively sought legislative and judicial exemptions to 
protect traditionalist refusals: Catholic adoption agencies refused to place 
children with same-sex couples,102 Evangelical wedding vendors refused 
to provide goods and services to same-sex couples,103 and some state 
clerks and judges refused to issue marriage licenses and solemnize 
marriages.104  Some conservative states began to propose or enact their 
own RFRAs to protect such rights to refuse, some with explosive 
political and economic consequences.105 
The conservative dissenters in Obergefell raised concerns that 
religious objectors were not sufficiently protected, and that nothing 
would stop the government from penalizing and excluding churches with 
beliefs in traditional marriage for being bigoted, discriminatory 
institutions.106  The dissent’s concerns were taken up in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, where the Court 
admonished a state for showing disrespect and disparagement toward 
those who make refusal claims.107  In Masterpiece, a Christian baker 
refused to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, claiming, inter 
alia, a religious exemption from public accommodations law.108  The 
Court did not reach the merits, but did find that the state civil rights 
commission treated him with “a clear and impermissible hostility toward 
the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection.”109  Two other 
cases involving wedding vendor refusal claims were remanded from the 
Supreme Court, and a new petition for certiorari has been filed by the 
wedding vendor in one of those cases.110 
 
 100. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015). 
 101. See Carmella, Catholic Institutions, supra note 47, at 61–62.  
 102. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-
123, 2020 WL 871694 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020) (mem.). 
 103. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018). 
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Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-
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Rights, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 46–50 (2015). 
 106. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2638 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 107. 138 S. Ct. at 1729. 
 108. Id. at 1723. 
 109. Id. at 1729. 
 110. See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, 441 P.3d 1203, 1209 (Wash. 2019), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 19-333 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019); Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1056 (Or. 
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The liberal dissents in both Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece thought 
the protections had gone too far.  Justice Ginsburg’s Hobby Lobby 
dissent argued that RFRA should not apply to businesses but rather only 
to churches carrying out their religious purposes.111  The dissenters in 
Hobby Lobby were concerned that the impact of the exemption—the 
unavailability of insurance coverage for contraceptives—would be 
staggering.112  Moreover, the dissenters in Masterpiece argued that the 
harms to same-sex couples resulting from the baker’s refusal far 
outweighed the comments of a few state commissioners that had not 
demonstrably infected the proceedings.113  Such calls for a narrowed 
scope of religious freedom focus on the avoidance of third-party harms 
and skepticism toward the legitimacy of refusal claims against 
contraception and same-sex marriage. 
Many religious liberals were dismayed by the loss of all sense of 
proportion in exemption claims.  The ease with which the Hobby Lobby 
Court found a substantial burden was troubling.  The statutory word 
“substantial” qualifies the term “burden” for a reason.114  Further, 
religious liberals balked when conservative religious nonprofits refused 
to sign a form that made it possible for them to obtain the workaround 
exemption in Zubik, warning that “religious liberty can be endangered by 
exaggerated claims and overreaching as well as by government 
intransigence and judicial under enforcement.”115  They cautioned that 
legislatures would react by repealing existing religious exemptions or 
rejecting exemptions altogether.116 
The culture wars continue unabated.  Some liberal states require 
employer insurance to provide abortion coverage.117  Other states protect 
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 112. Id. 
 113. 138 S. Ct. at 1748, 1751–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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 115. Brief of Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 6, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-
35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 692850. 
 116. Id. at 4. 
 117. See Adam Sonfield & Elizabeth Nash, States Lead the Way in Promoting Coverage of 
Abortion in Medicaid and Private Insurance, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 24, 2019), 
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Foothill Church v. Rouillard, a California court evaluated a challenge to the requirement that 
employee health insurance include abortion coverage.  371 F. Supp. 3d 742 (E.D. Cal. 2019), appeal 
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assisted reproduction coverage for same-sex couples,118 or require 
hospitals to provide abortions119 and contraception120 in emergency 
situations, regardless of religious or moral objection.  Further, state 
legislatures and courts are embroiled in controversies over whether states 
must pay for gender confirmation treatment and surgery, and whether to 
provide religious or moral exemptions.121  Some conservative states 
recently passed restrictive abortion laws,122 as well as conscience laws 
that broadly protect refusals based on a belief in traditional marriage and 
gender immutability from discrimination claims or penalty.123  And 
conservatives continue to press for a federal First Amendment Defense 
Act, which would ensure that no penalties could attach to refusals based 
on traditional beliefs regarding sexual and family matters.124 
Despite politically charged cases like Hobby Lobby and Obergefell, 
the Court has continued to protect religious minorities under RFRA and 
RLUIPA.  Liberals and conservatives may disagree over the application 
of strict scrutiny in any given case, but three unanimous decisions bear 
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Affordable Care Act.  Id. 
 122. K.K. Rebecca Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills to Limit the Procedure This 
Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/us/abortion-laws-
states.html [https://perma.cc/9288-YVNK]. 
 123. See, e.g., H.B. 1523, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016).  In 2016, the Mississippi 
Legislature passed H.B. 1523, which broadly protects those who believe in traditional marriage and 
gender immutability from adverse consequences, discrimination, or penalty.  See id.  Liberal clergy, 
among other plaintiffs, challenged the constitutionality of the statute under the Establishment Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 350 
(5th Cir. 2017).  But the Fifth Circuit determined they lacked standing to bring the challenge.  Id. at 
358 (“The failure of the Barber plaintiffs to assert anything more than a general stigmatic injury 
dooms their claim to standing . . . .”). 
 124. S. 2525, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018). 
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mentioning.  In Cutter v. Wilkinson, prisoners brought RLUIPA claims 
against prison administrators who defended the statutory claims with an 
Establishment Clause challenge to the statute.125  Plaintiffs were all from 
nonmainstream religions,126 which is typical in prison litigation.  The 
Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld RLUIPA, finding that increasing 
protection of prisoners’ religious rights did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.127  The Court expressed confidence that RLUIPA, which adopts a 
“compelling governmental interest” standard, would “be applied in an 
appropriately balanced way” to specific cases to grant or deny 
exemptions.128 
A year later, in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal, the Court, interpreting RFRA, held that a small religious 
group’s sacramental use of an illegal drug must be exempt from the 
Controlled Substances Act.129  The federal government argued for 
uniformity but failed to demonstrate any difficulties with granting an 
exemption, especially given the experience with a pre-existing peyote 
exemption, which produced no ill effects on the Act’s enforceability.130  
It was not sufficient for the government to argue that the law “serves a 
compelling purpose and simply admits of no exceptions . . . .  RFRA 
requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test 
is satisfied through application of the challenged law ‘to the person’––the 
particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being 
substantially burdened.”131 
In 2015, the Court in Holt v. Hobbs held that Gregory Holt (also 
known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad), a Muslim prisoner, was exempt 
from a prison’s facial hair prohibition under RLUIPA.132  Muhammad 
refused to shave his beard, and the Court held RLUIPA allowed him to 
 
 125. 544 U.S. 709, 713–14 (2005). 
 126. Id. at 712. 
 127. Id. at 719–20.   
 128. Id. at 722–23.  
 129. 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006). 
 130. Id. at 436–37. 
 131. Id. at 430–31 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2018)).  In discussing Cutter, the 
Gonzales Court noted: 
  We reaffirmed just last Term the feasibility of case-by-case consideration of religious 
exemptions to generally applicable rules. . . .  We had “no cause to believe” that 
[RLUIPA’s] compelling interest test “would not be applied in an appropriately balanced 
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that courts were not up to the task. 
Id. at 436 (quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722). 
 132. 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015). 
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maintain a half-inch beard in accordance with his faith.133  The Court 
“doubt[ed] whether the prohibition against [Muhammad’s] beard 
further[ed] its compelling interest about contraband,” and “conclude[d] 
that the [prison] ha[d] failed to show that its policy [was] the least 
restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests.”134  With the 
Court’s close look at government alternatives to burdening religious 
practices, Gonzales and Holt show that as courts “strik[e] sensible 
balances,” they can indeed protect minority faiths.135 
C. The Trump Administration: Reinforcing Conservative Religious 
Freedom and the Dominance of Refusal Claims 
Donald Trump was elected President with the help of religious 
conservatives, especially the Evangelical community.136  Evangelicals, as 
well as the Catholic bishops, argued vehemently with the Obama 
administration over the contraceptive mandate137 and especially the 
separate workaround requirements for religious nonprofits.138  For many, 
the mandate represented a secular-liberal, big-government attack on 
religious freedom.139  The mandate galvanized religious conservatives, 
who painted a picture of Democrats as antireligious ideologues willing to 
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“nationwide government coercion of religious people and groups to sell, broker, or purchase 
‘services’ to which they have a moral or religious objection,” and “represents an unprecedented 
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fine nonprofits and businesses out of existence when they refused to 
abandon their faith.140  The Trump agenda follows the conservative 
religious narrative; the administration holds itself out as a corrective to 
the previous liberal administration.141 
1. A Broad Religious Liberty Agenda 
In January 2017, within days of taking office, President Trump 
issued an executive order that introduced a travel ban,142 which 
implemented his campaign promise to order a “total and complete 
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”143  The Supreme Court 
later upheld the third version of that ban, which severely limited visas to 
citizens from five majority-Muslim nations.144 
Liberals thought it hypocritical when, a few months later, Trump 
issued another executive order, this one on “Promoting Free Speech and 
Religious Liberty.”145  With conservative grievances toward the 
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13,831, 83 Fed. Reg. 20,715 (May 3, 2018) (establishing a White House Faith and Opportunity 
Initiative).  The initiative, however, appears to be dormant.  For criticism of the initiative, see 
Melissa Rogers, President Trump Just Unveiled a New White House ‘Faith’ Office. It Actually 
 
2020] PROGRESSIVE RELIGION 559 
contraception mandate and the Obergefell decision still fresh, the order 
laid out a religious freedom agenda responsive to these concerns.146  
First, it directed the Attorney General to issue “guidance interpreting 
religious liberty protections in Federal law.”147  Second, it directed the 
Secretaries of Labor, Treasury, and HHS to “consider issuing amended 
regulations, consistent with applicable law, to address conscience-based 
objections” to the contraceptive mandate.148  And third, it directed the 
Secretary of the Treasury to: 
[E]nsure . . . that the Department of the Treasury does not take any 
adverse action against any individual, house of worship, or other 
religious organization on the basis that such individual or organization 
speaks or has spoken about moral or political issues from a religious 
perspective, where speech of similar character has, consistent with law, 
not ordinarily been treated as participation or intervention in a political 
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) a candidate for public office 
by the Department of Treasury.149 
Each initiative is discussed below. 
a. The Attorney General’s Guidance on Religious Liberty 
On October 6, 2017, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Guidance Document on “Principles of 
Religious Liberty” in a memorandum for all executive departments and 
agencies entitled “Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty.”150  
The Guidance Document directs the DOJ to provide broad protection of 
religious freedom, echoing Hobby Lobby: “Except in the narrowest 
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 150. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to All Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Oct. 6, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1001891/download [https://perma.cc/459M-
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document.  Matt Zapotosky & Sarah Pulliam Bailey, Civil Liberties Groups Decry Sessions’s 
Guidance on Religions Freedom, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
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circumstances, no one should be forced to choose between living out his 
or her faith and complying with the law.”151  The Guidance Document 
sets forth twenty “principles of religious liberty,” which include the right 
to act or abstain from acting; the extension of these rights to 
organizations, even some for-profit corporations; and the durability of 
these rights, which are not surrendered in order to participate in the 
marketplace, public square, or government programs.152 
Two elements are worth noting in particular.  The Guidance 
Document states that third party burdens, while relevant to RFRA 
analysis, do not automatically render an exemption unavailable.153  This 
position rejects the harsh liberal criticism of exemptions for conservative 
causes based on their negative effects on women, LGBTQ individuals, or 
others.  Additionally, the Guidance Document broadens protections for 
religious employers receiving federal grants or contracts, because it 
forbids the government from conditioning the receipt of federal monies 
on requiring the grantee or contract party to give up its religious 
character or its hiring exemptions.154  The main impact is to protect 
religious entities that refuse to hire or retain LGBTQ individuals, an 
outcome that liberals vigorously oppose.155 
Consistent with the Guidance Document, the DOJ sided with the 
baker in Masterpiece156 and supported the Archdiocese of Washington’s 
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 156. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cake 
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effort to buy Christmas advertisements on public transportation.157  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris 
Funeral Homes, which frames the issue as whether Title VII protects 
transgender persons.158  In that case, a funeral owner refused to allow an 
employee on staff who intended to transition from male to female to 
wear the female uniform.159  The owner, seeking an exemption, argued 
unsuccessfully in the Sixth Circuit that authorizing or paying for a 
transgender female employee to wear the female uniform substantially 
burdened the owner’s religious belief that one’s sex is “an immutable 
God-given gift” in violation of RFRA, would hinder the grieving 
mourners’ healing, and pressure the owner to leave the funeral 
ministry.160  Even though RFRA is not at issue in the Supreme Court, the 
DOJ supports the religious refusal claim, arguing that Title VII does not 
protect transgender persons.161 
b. Reversal of the Contraceptive Mandate and Centralization of the 
Protection of Conscience 
Although the Guidance Document defines religious freedom to 
include “the right to act or abstain from action,”162 the Trump 
administration is overwhelmingly concerned with protecting the latter––
refusal claims.  This goal comes into sharpest focus in efforts to reverse 
the contraception mandate and establish a centralized office for 
conscience-based refusal claims in the health care field. 
On October 13, 2017, HHS, in collaboration with the U.S. 
Department of Treasury and the U.S. Department of Labor, issued two 
interim final rules to establish exemptions for employers and insurers 
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with religious and moral objections from the contraceptive mandate.163  
The 2017 Religious Interim Rule allowed any employer with objections 
based on religious beliefs to opt out of providing no-cost contraceptive 
coverage.164  This exemption included not only nonprofit entities but all 
for-profit entities, including publicly traded corporations, far beyond the 
closely held corporation exemption of Hobby Lobby.165  A federal district 
court in Pennsylvania, however, issued a nationwide preliminary 
injunction, enjoining the Trump administration from enforcing the 
interim final rules.166 
While the appeal of the preliminary injunction was pending, HHS 
issued two final rules (2018 Final Rules) “virtually identical” to the 2017 
interim final rules.167  On January 14, 2019, the day the 2018 Final Rules 
were scheduled to take effect,168 the federal district court in Pennsylvania 
issued another nationwide preliminary injunction.169  The Third Circuit 
affirmed,170 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in January 2020.171 
With the 2018 Final Rules tied up in court, plaintiffs in Texas 
brought a class action lawsuit challenging the Obama workaround rule,172 
which requires religious nonprofits to sign opt-out paperwork and is 
presumably still good law.  In June 2019, a federal district judge issued a 
 
 163. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 
C.F.R. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) [hereinafter 2017 Religious Interim Final Rule]; Moral 
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. 
2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
 164. 2017 Religious Interim Final Rule, supra note 163. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 585 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d sub nom. 
Pennsylvania v. President United States, 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019), as amended (July 18, 2019), 
cert granted sub nom. Little Sisters of Poor v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-431, 2020 WL 254158 (U.S. 
Jan. 17, 2020). 
 167. President United States, 930 F.3d at 559 (citing Religious Exemptions and 
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 
Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under 
the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) [hereinafter 2018 Moral Final Rule] [collectively hereinafter 
2018 Final Rules]).  The 2018 Moral Final Rule gives a similar opt-out to employers with objections 
based on moral convictions but excludes publicly traded corporations.  2018 Moral Final Rule, 
supra, at 57,593. 
 168. 2018 Final Rules, supra note 167. 
 169. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 798.  
 170. President U.S., 930 F.3d at 556.  The Third Circuit found, among other administrative law 
violations, that RFRA did not compel issuance of these rules.  Id. at 573. 
 171. Little Sisters of the Poor, 2020 WL 254168, at *1. 
 172. DeOtte v. Azar, 393 F. Supp. 3d 490 (N.D. Tex. 2019). 
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permanent nationwide injunction against the rule as a violation of 
RFRA.173  The injunction protects all individuals and all employers who 
object to contraceptive coverage based on sincerely held religious 
beliefs, including nonprofits and for-profits.174  This injunction produces 
the same result intended by the Trump administration’s 2018 Final 
Rules: a system of wholly voluntary participation in the workaround 
process.175 
Given the magnitude of the litigation, and the spotlight it put on 
conscientious refusals, HHS in January 2018 announced the 
establishment of the new Conscience and Religious Freedom Division to 
enforce twenty-five existing statutory provisions that protect the rights of 
conscience and religious freedom in the health care context.176  
Conscience protections began shortly after abortion was legalized to 
ensure that no health care professional or religiously affiliated hospital 
that refused to perform abortions would suffer discrimination, penalty, or 
liability.177  Since then, Congress has passed numerous conscience laws, 
but they are enforced by spending restraints, not by private causes of 
action.178  This new HHS Division provides a grievance process for 
health care workers coerced or discriminated against on the basis of their 
refusal to participate in abortion, sterilization, training for abortion, or 
euthanasia.179 
Entities receiving federal funding must certify compliance with all 
 
 173. Id. at 495. 
 174. Id. at 497, 499. 
 175. See Katie Keith, ACA Litigation Round-Up: Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (May 22, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190522.119710/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/2DVB-TBYL] (“Under the final religious objection rule, any nonprofit or for-profit 
that objects to providing contraceptives for religious reasons could decline the accommodations 
process altogether and would no longer have to notify the government or take other steps regarding 
contraceptive access for employees.”). 
 176. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS Announces New Conscience 
and Religious Freedom Division (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2018/01/18 
/hhs-ocr-announces-new-conscience-and-religious-freedom-division.html [https://perma.cc/5HN5-
BTUK].  See Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegation of Authority, 84 
Fed. Reg. 23,170, 23,229 (May 21, 2019) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88) [hereinafter 2019 Final 
Rule]. 
 177. See Mlsna, supra note 86, at 476–82 (describing federal and state health care conscience 
laws). 
 178. Id.; see also Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 697–99 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(affirming summary judgment for a hospital and denying a nurse’s claim alleging her supervisors 
compelled her to participate in a late-term abortion in violation of a federal conscience law because 
the statute did not confer a private right of action to enforce its terms). 
 179. Conscience Protections for Health Care Providers, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/conscience/conscience-protections/index.html [https://perma.cc/TX7L-
QK58] (last reviewed Mar. 22, 2018).  
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twenty-five laws.180  Nineteen states, the District of Columbia, Chicago, 
and New York City, have sued to enjoin these rules from going into 
effect, criticizing the breadth of personnel they protect and their 
applicability to emergency situations.181 
c. The Johnson Amendment 
The May 2017 executive order directed the Secretary of the Treasury 
to treat religious institutions with leniency in enforcing a provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code, known as the Johnson Amendment, that 
prohibits nonprofits, including religious nonprofits, from participating in 
political campaigns for elective office.182  The executive order did not 
correct any actual problem because the Internal Revenue Service already 
underenforces the provision, as many churches make clear their moral-
political stand on issues, parties, and, perhaps with more subtlety, 
candidates.183  Whether this brings about any significant change in 
practice among churches remains to be seen. 
2. A Narrow Establishment Clause: Religious Entities Not Required to 
Abandon Religion to Qualify for Government Funds and Contracts 
The Guidance Document prioritizes free exercise over establishment 
concerns.  This is the predominant conservative approach, with generous 
protections for religious exercise like that in Hobby Lobby alongside a 
narrow Establishment Clause that only reinforces the goals of free 
exercise.  Indeed, a mere three paragraphs out of the twenty-five-page 
document is dedicated to the Establishment Clause, which is described 
only as promoting religious freedom.184  The Guidance Document makes 
no mention of the Clause’s independent function to restrict some types of 
 
 180. 2019 Final Rule, supra note 176, at 23,179. 
 181. Larry Neumeister, States Sue Over Rule Allowing Clinicians to Refuse Abortions, AP NEWS 
(May 21, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/283128836a38414bb502216dd0a08be1 [https://perma.cc/ 
B3KV-N72Q]. 
 182. Exec. Order No. 13,798, supra note 145, at 21,675 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018)). 
 183. See Emma Green, Why Trump’s Executive Order on Religious Liberty Left Many 
Conservatives Dissatisfied, ATLANTIC (May 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2017/05/religious-freedom-executive-order/525354/ [https://perma.cc/4VZG-P9XN] (“[T]he 
administration instructed the agency to ‘exercise maximum enforcement discretion of the 
prohibition.’  But that language may be misleading: The IRS already enforces the provision 
extremely rarely, even when pastors have mailed in tape recordings of potentially law-violating 
sermons in the hopes of provoking the agency.”). 
 184. Religious Liberty Guidance Document, supra note 150, at 3, 4a. 
2020] PROGRESSIVE RELIGION 565 
religious exercise.185  Liberals are more committed to defining that 
independent function, and now even more vehement in restricting 
exemptions.186 
The most significant implication of a narrow reading of this 
Establishment Clause is that government is freer to fund and contract 
with religious entities.  The DOJ views any religiously based 
disqualification from a government benefit program as discrimination 
and frames it within the free exercise refusal claim paradigm.187  The 
DOJ notes that “the denial of, or condition on the receipt of, government 
benefits may substantially burden” religious exercise.188  As in Sherbert 
v. Verner,189 the DOJ sides with religious schools and service providers 
who refuse to give up their religious identity in order to qualify for a 
government benefit or contract.190  The DOJ’s stance is rooted not only 
in Sherbert but also quite explicitly in the recent decision of Trinity 
Lutheran Church v. Comer.191  In that case, Missouri’s Department of 
Natural Resources disqualified Trinity Lutheran Church, which operates 
a preschool and daycare center, from receiving state grants to help defray 
costs of rubber playground surfaces made from recycled tires pursuant to 
its policy of denying grants to religious entities.192  This categorical 
exclusion of religious entities from the government program, the Court 
explained, “puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It may participate in an 
otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious institution.”193  
The Court held that the denial of generally available benefits to Trinity 
Lutheran because of its religious character violated the Free Exercise 
 
 185. See id.  For a discussion of the Establishment Clause’s independent function to restrict 
religious exercise, see Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Thought on the Common Good: A Place for 
Establishment Clause Limits to Religious Exercise, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 546 (2019) [hereinafter 
Carmella, Catholic Thought on the Common Good]. 
 186. Carmella, Catholic Thought on the Common Good, supra note 185, at 551. 
 187. See Religious Liberty Guidance Document, supra note 150, at 6 (“As a general matter, the 
federal government may not condition receipt of a federal grant or contract on the effective 
relinquishment of a religious organization’s hiring exemptions or attributes of its religious 
character.”). 
 188. Id. at 5a. 
 189. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 190. See Religious Liberty Guidance Document, supra note 150, at 4a (“[R]eligious adherents 
and organizations may, like nonreligious adherents and organizations, receive indirect financial aid 
through independent choice, or, in certain circumstances, direct financial aid through a secular-aid 
program.”). 
 191. See id. at 3a (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 
(2017)).   
 192. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017. 
 193. Id. at 2021–22.  
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Clause.194  While Trinity Lutheran’s scope is unclear, given that the 
plurality decision is explicitly limited to its facts,195 the DOJ reads the 
decision broadly to mean that categorical religious exclusion from a 
group of beneficiaries signals religious discrimination.196  The refusal 
claim paradigm is evident: Trinity Lutheran refused to give up its 
religious status in order to qualify for the state playground grant.197 
a. Education 
The analysis in Trinity Lutheran has been more than thirty years in 
the making.  The Supreme Court has eroded the liberal strict separation 
of church and state that dominated the parochial school jurisprudence of 
the 1970s and 1980s and replaced it with greater tolerance for church-
state cooperation between religiously affiliated schools and 
government.198  Conservative plaintiffs worked hard to move the 
jurisprudence in the direction of inclusion of religious entities, and 
successfully reframed the exclusion of religious schools from benefit 
programs as a matter of unconstitutional discrimination under the Free 
Speech or Free Exercise Clause instead of an Establishment Clause 
demand.199  The Trump administration is pursuing this cooperation and 
inclusion as far as it can.  Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos is 
committed to the public funding of nonpublic schools, including 
religious schools.200  She would like to see an end to state constitutional 
provisions, currently on the books in thirty-seven states, that prohibit 
public funds from reaching religious schools.201  The Supreme Court 
 
 194. Id. at 2025. 
 195. Id. at 2024 n.3. 
 196. Religious Liberty Guidance Document, supra note 150, at 3a (relying on Trinity Lutheran 
for the proposition that “a law that disqualifies a religious person or organization from a right to 
compete for a public benefit—including a grant or contract—because of the person’s religious 
character is neither neutral nor generally applicable”). 
 197. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017. 
 198. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822 (1995); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004); Trinity 
Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017. 
 199. See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822; Locke, 540 U.S. at 715; 
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2014. 
 200. See, e.g., Erica L. Green, DeVos Moves to Loosen Restrictions on Federal Aid to Religious 
Colleges, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/us/politics/betsy-devos-
religious-christian-education-federal-aid.html [https://perma.cc/M7B2-NUQA]. 
 201. DeVos Bashes Bans on Tax Dollars in Religious Schools, UNITED FED’N OF TEACHERS 
(June 7, 2018), http://www.uft.org/news-briefs/devos-bashes-bans-tax-dollars-religious-schools 
[https://perma.cc/2LV2-4FX8]. 
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granted certiorari on a case that could decide this issue.202 
It should come as no surprise that the DOJ supports this position.  In 
a lawsuit challenging a religious exclusion from a tuition program, the 
DOJ filed a statement of interest to argue that no one should be excluded 
from a government benefit program for religious reasons.203  Moreover, 
in consultation with the DOJ, DeVos announced in March 2019 that the 
federal government will no longer enforce a provision in federal law that 
disqualifies religiously affiliated contractors from providing services like 
special education, tutoring, or mentoring as part of the federal law’s 
requirement that students receive equitable services.204  Districts are no 
longer subject to federal enforcement if they hire religious service 
providers.205 
b. Federal Contracts 
Under an August 2018 Department of Labor directive (2018 
Directive), businesses and religious nonprofits likely will not lose federal 
contracts because their faith-based policies and practices discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.206  Multiple laws 
prohibit contractors and subcontractors from discriminating on many 
criteria, including sexual orientation and gender identity; at the same 
time, religious organizations are exempt from antidiscrimination laws 
when it comes to employing coreligionists and those who agree to 
 
 202. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603 (Mont. 2018) (finding a student 
scholarship tax credit program unconstitutional under the Montana Constitution), cert. granted, 139 
S. Ct. 2777 (2019) (mem.).  
 203. See United States’ Statement of Interest in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Carson v. Makin, 401 F. Supp. 3d 207 (D. Me. 2019) (No. 1:18-CV-327-DBH), appeal 
filed, No. 19-1746 (1st Cir. Aug. 2, 2019). 
 204. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Finds ESEA Restriction 
on Religious Organizations Unconstitutional, Will No Longer Enforce (Mar. 11, 2019), https: 
//www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-finds-esea-restriction-religious-organiza 
tions-unconstitutional-will-no-longer-enforce [https://perma.cc/5JT5-FGF2] (“[T]he statutory 
provisions in Section 1117(d)(2)(B) and 8501(d)(2)(B) of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act . . . run counter to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 
Inc. v. Comer that, under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 
otherwise eligible recipients cannot be disqualified from a public benefit solely because of their 
religious character.  Given this decision, the Department will no longer enforce these 
provisions . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 205. Id.  
 206. OFFICE OF FED. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DIRECTIVE 
2018-03, EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246 § 204(C), RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION (2018), https://www.dol.gov/ 
ofccp/regs/compliance/directives/dir2018_03.html [https://perma.cc/6PTU-MPU9] [hereinafter 2018 
DIRECTIVE]. 
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comply with religious teachings.207  In light of Masterpiece, Trinity 
Lutheran, Hobby Lobby, and the Trump administration executive orders, 
the 2018 Directive asserts the paramount value of religious freedom and 
instructs compliance staffers to take these developments into account 
when enforcing antidiscrimination provisions.208  In summarizing 
relevant law on the topic, the 2018 Directive notes that the staffers must: 
be neutral and nonjudgmental toward religious beliefs;209 not condition 
contract opportunities on the recipient’s abandoning their religious 
status;210 allow faith-based organization to “compete on a level playing 
field for . . . [Federal] contracts;”211 and respect the free exercise of 
religious organizations free of “discrimination or retaliation.”212  By way 
of example, HHS recently decided to fund Miracle Hill Ministries in 
South Carolina, even though it refuses to place foster children with non-
Christians or with same-sex couples.213  Recently proposed Department 
of Labor rules would allow religious employers with federal contracts, 
both nonprofits and businesses, to exclude LGBTQ persons from 
employment.214 
3. RLUIPA Enforcement 
The Civil Rights Division of the DOJ continues robust enforcement 
of the land use provisions of RLUIPA.215  These efforts consistently 
 
 207. For instance, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, provides that religious 
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 212. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,798, supra note 145, § 1). 
 213. Angelia Davis, Miracle Hill Gets Religious Exemptions to Provide Foster Care in SC 
Despite Complaints, GREENVILLE NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/story 
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 214. See Implementing Legal Requirements Regarding the Equal Opportunity Clause’s Religious 
Exemption, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,677 (proposed on Aug. 15, 2019) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. pt. 60).  
The proposed rules set out a broad exemption to allow religious employers who are federal 
contractors “to condition employment on acceptance of or adherence to religious tenets as 
understood by the employing contractor,” as long as the employer did not engage in discrimination 
on other protected grounds, like race.  Id. at 41,679. 
 215. For information on enforcement of RLUIPA’s land use provisions, see Religious Freedom 
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receive broad support among both conservatives and liberals, since 
enforcement ensures fair treatment in the zoning process to all religious 
groups in siting and renovating houses of worship and other religious 
land uses.216 
III. RELIGIOUS LIBERALS DURING THE CULTURE WARS: THE USE OF 
SOFT POWER 
Religious liberals reject the advertised linkage between religion and 
conservative causes, emphasizing instead social and economic issues 
ignored by traditionalists.  While liberals may be interested in limiting 
religious exemptions in reaction to the conservative narrative, recent 
progressive litigants, like their conservative counterparts, may now want 
more robust free exercise protections to pursue their own moral 
agenda.217  In both theory and practice, there is a long history of 
advocacy for progressive causes stretching back to abolition, civil rights, 
and antiwar and antipoverty efforts.  Public intellectuals like E.J. 
Dionne,218 Vincent Rougeau,219 and Steven Shiffrin220 draw on more than 
 
in Focus Newsletters, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/crt/combating-religious-
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than pleasingly surprised by the Trump administration’s support” in this case.  Sarah Maslin Nir, 
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[https://perma.cc/PV9N-29AE]. 
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Relations: A Response to Kent Greenawalt and Bernie Meyler, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 
762–63 (2010). 
 218. See E.J. DIONNE, JR., SOULED OUT: RECLAIMING FAITH AND POLITICS AFTER THE 
RELIGIOUS RIGHT 1 (2008) (“[R]eligious faith should not be seen as leading ineluctably to 
conservative political convictions.”).   
 219. See VINCENT D. ROUGEAU, CHRISTIANS IN THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: FAITH AND 
CITIZENSHIP IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 19 (2008) (arguing the religious right does not have “a 
Christian mandate for their political agenda”).  See also generally Vincent D. Rougeau, Catholic 
Social Teaching and Global Migration: Bridging the Paradox of Universal Human Rights and 
Territorial Self-Determination, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 343 (2008) (arguing that secular conceptions 
of human dignity within liberal political theory share commonalities with Catholic Social Thought). 
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a hundred years of Catholic social teachings that speak powerfully to the 
dignity of the human person, the stewardship of creation, and the 
common good.  Mainline Protestant churches, with their long presence 
on Capitol Hill, have over a century of experience advocating for human 
rights and a more just economy, society, and legal system.221  
Collaborative efforts over the decades between Christians and minority 
faiths, the Jewish community in particular, have educated lawmakers not 
only on minority practices but also on matters of civil liberties, equality, 
and social justice.222 
The cacophony of the culture wars tends to overshadow religious 
progressive voices.  But no area of law has been untouched by their 
witness: for fifty years they have been lobbying, protesting, and 
educating at the grass roots level on issues of environmental policy,223 
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international human rights,224 war and torture,225 immigration,226 civil 
rights and racism,227 criminal justice and the death penalty,228 universal 
health care,229 poverty and welfare,230 human trafficking and domestic 
violence,231 gun control,232 and in providing sanctuary to the 
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undocumented,233 social and health services to the poor and homeless,234 
substance abuse counseling,235 refugee resettlement,236 and prison 
reentry,237 among many other ministries.  Religious liberals have also 
been particularly committed to the rights of religious minorities and to 
religious diversity and ecumenism.238  They have supported efforts to 
protect the LGBTQ community.239  They have been, and continue to be, 
present in the political and legal spheres, challenging those laws that 
violate their vision of the common good of society through advocacy and 
litigation. 
Despite their considerable presence, however, religious liberals have 
not organized effectively as a political movement in the ways that 
religious conservatives have during this culture war period.  A definable 
“religious left” emerged at the start of the Obama presidency,240 which 
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gave considerable focus to progressive religious causes but was quickly 
overshadowed by the religious conservative outrage at the contraception 
mandate and other policies viewed as hostile to religion.  Furthermore, 
the Catholic Church, with its historic emphasis on economic and social 
justice, has had its moral agenda torn in two.  Its opposition to abortion 
and same-sex marriage has pulled it in closer public alignment with 
religious conservatives, obscuring from public view its robust 
commitment to just immigration policy, provision of social services, and 
health care reform.  Its refusals to provide abortions and contraception to 
victims of human trafficking and to place children with same-sex couples 
tend to overshadow its superb work in helping those victims241 and in 
providing adoption services.242 
A. Liberal Refusal Claims: When the State Mandates Conduct Contrary 
to Faith 
Though refusal claims have become the mainstay of present-day 
religious conservatives, religious liberals have had their share of 
conscientious objection.  The classic example is pacifist opposition to 
military service.  Indeed, it was the involvement of many religious 
people in the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era that led the Supreme 
Court to revise the definition of religion based on theological writings 
and thereby expand the scope of the exemption from military service in 
federal law.243 
The Court later added significantly to the scope of that conscientious 
objection to war in Thomas v. Review Board.244  In that case, Eddie 
Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness working at a munitions factory, was 
moved to a position manufacturing military tank turrets.245  Like Adele 
Sherbert, who was fired for refusing to take a job that required work on 
her Sabbath,246 Thomas was fired for refusing this position because the 
tank turret line involved him directly participating in the manufacture of 
weapons, whereas his prior job involved him only indirectly with 
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manufacturing materials that may ultimately be used in weapons 
production.247  In his challenge to the denial of unemployment 
compensation, the Supreme Court found that his understanding of 
complicity and the line he drew, while not required or recommended by 
his church, was a sincerely held religious belief and deserved deference 
under Sherbert.248  The Court recognized that faith-based refusals to 
participate in war includes not only the bearing of arms but also their 
manufacture, and should be constitutionally protected.249 
In addition to religious pacifists, those with religious scruples against 
participating in the death penalty can find themselves in conflict with the 
law.  There have always been problems associated with finding someone 
to serve as the executioner.  Throughout history, detailed protocols 
evolved to ensure that no one person would bear the full responsibility 
for the act.250  Now that executions involve professionals using advanced 
technology, organizations like the American Medical Association 
discourage participation.251  In a 2006 California case, for instance, two 
anesthesiologists who initially agreed to attend an execution later refused 
to do so when they discovered that a court order required their active 
participation in monitoring the prisoner for pain levels, as required by 
law.252 
Where the death penalty is in force, extensive conscience laws 
protect federal and state employees and contractors who refuse to 
participate in executions.253  The federal protections are broad, shielding 
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individuals from direct and indirect participation.254  State protections are 
more varied, with some allowing opt-outs without asking for any reason 
and others requiring a moral, ethical, or religious objection.255  Counting 
the states that have exemptions and those that have repealed the death 
penalty altogether, objectors enjoy some or total conscience protections 
at the federal level, in thirty-six states, and in the District of Columbia.256 
Refusal claims can also arise in the context of severe immigration 
laws that require citizens to participate in enforcement.  In 2006, the 
Senate considered a bill the House of Representatives passed that would 
have, among other things, made it a crime to serve undocumented 
immigrants.257  The Catholic bishops were outraged.  Cardinal Roger 
Mahoney, then-archbishop of Los Angeles, said he would instruct his 
priests and lay people to defy the law if enacted.258  This set off a protest 
movement that energized dioceses all over the country to get involved in 
immigrant justice programs.259 
B. Liberal Affirmative Claims: When the State Restrains Conduct 
Motivated or Mandated by Faith 
It is not surprising that the archbishop’s defiance set off a larger 
movement.  Standing up to a state mandate of a specific act is a dramatic 
way of asserting religious rights.  But for liberals, it has not always been 
the most common.  Most of the progressive conflicts with government in 
the last fifty years involve affirmative actions that are usually lawful, but 
unlawful in some places or under certain circumstances.260  For instance, 
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the antiwar Plowshares movement, begun by the Berrigan brothers in the 
1980s, involved illegal trespass on military bases to protest the presence 
of nuclear weapons.261  Such acts differ from the refusal claims of the 
military conscientious objector or the death penalty physician, in which 
the state mandates an act. 
A good example of an affirmative claim involves the pre-Obergefell 
practice of some liberal churches blessing or solemnizing the unions of 
same-sex couples.  These had no legal effect, of course, but they served 
as a sign of religious commitment.262  When liberal states began to 
legalize same-sex marriage, conservative states started amending their 
constitutions to define marriage as exclusively between a man and 
woman.263  North Carolina not only amended its constitution but also 
passed a companion statute that made it a crime to solemnize the 
marriage of a couple that did not have a valid marriage license.264  A 
broad coalition of churches and clergy––including the United Church of 
Christ, various organizations of Baptists, Lutherans, and Unitarian 
Universalists, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, and 
individual Episcopal, Jewish, and Baptist clergy––challenged the statute 
as an unconstitutional restriction on religious freedom, a burden on 
religious exercise without compelling justification.265  They sought an 
immediate injunction against the state law, based on a Fourth Circuit 
ruling that had contemporaneously barred restrictions on same-sex 
marriage.266  In light of that case, the federal district court found the 
state’s ban on same-sex marriage, including the clergy restriction and 
penalties, unconstitutional.267  The religious claim was affirmative 
because the churches wanted freedom to conduct a ceremony, but the 
state had rendered the ceremony illegal.268  The state action was to 
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restrain, not to mandate a particular action. 
The provision of sanctuary is another good example of an affirmative 
religious act restrained in some ways by law.269  In the 1980s, hundreds 
of churches—Catholic, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Unitarian—helped 
refugees escaping from civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala by 
providing sanctuary on their properties.270  Immigration authorities did 
not attempt to enter churches to make arrests, but federal agents 
infiltrated churches to gain information and arrest some of the leaders of 
the movement.271  High profile prosecutions were intended to deter 
church involvement, although much of the movement continued.272  The 
free exercise defenses to those prosecutions failed in the face of the 
government’s compelling interest in national border security.273  Some 
clergy and lay people were convicted.274  Some states have passed even 
more draconian laws.  In 2011, Alabama prohibited so many types of 
contact with undocumented persons that clergy sued, claiming that the 
law “criminalize[d] basic parts of Christian ministry.”275 
The federal government’s policy evolved into less aggressive 
restraints over the next few decades as the sanctuary movement changed 
its focus.  Churches involved in the “New” Sanctuary Movement, which 
began in the mid-2000s in reaction to the severity of proposed 
immigration laws, attended to protecting the many employed and 
productive individuals (and their families) facing deportation.276  While 
immigration authorities had long avoided arrests in churches, a 2011 
memorandum set forth the policy: U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) would not target churches, schools, and other 
“sensitive locations” for enforcement.277  In some cases, ICE agents even 
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worked with clergy to find solutions.278 
Perhaps the largest and most far-ranging area of affirmative acts 
involves the religious desire to serve the poor.  Here, churches can end 
up in conflict with zoning laws and other local ordinances that restrain 
their religious conduct.279  Below are three cases—under RFRA, 
RLUIPA, and the Free Exercise Clause—that find that there is a conflict 
between religious exercise and law, with law restraining service to the 
poor in ways that do not serve a compelling interest in a least restrictive 
manner.  These courts agreed with the churches’ arguments that their 
affirmative acts in service to the poor, even in wealthy neighborhoods, 
were as central to their faith as worship and should not be restrained.280 
In Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of 
District of Columbia, a church sued the zoning board to enjoin 
enforcement of an ordinance that prohibited the church from serving 
meals to homeless individuals at its location without a variance.281  The 
church won its motion for summary judgment on the grounds that 
enforcing the zoning ordinance would substantially burden the church’s 
religious exercise.282  The Church argued that serving the poor is “a 
religious function rooted in the Bible” and “a requirement for spiritual 
redemption.”283  The federal district court agreed that the feeding 
program was religious exercise, calling it “a form of worship akin to 
prayer.”284  Having reached this conclusion, the court explained that the 
First Amendment and RFRA compelled it to find in favor of the Church 
and held that the Church “may use its building for prayer and other 
religious services as a matter of right and should be able, as a matter of 
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right, to use the building to minister to the needy.”285 
Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York involved a 
church that allowed homeless persons to sleep on multiple landings at the 
tops of staircases leading into its main sanctuary.286  After notice to the 
Church, New York City police entered church property to remove these 
guests as part of an aggressive policy to place the homeless in city 
shelters.287  The Church sued, arguing that it “views its outdoor space as 
a sanctuary for the service-resistant homeless who prefer not to sleep in 
shelters.”288  The Church claimed that its outdoor sanctuary “forms an 
integral part of its religious mission.”289  Through this ministry, the 
Church “giv[es] the love of God . . . .  There is perhaps no higher act of 
worship for a Christian.”290  The district court held that, under the Free 
Exercise Clause, the city burdened the Church’s religious exercise and 
did not establish that sending the homeless to the shelters would be the 
least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest that justified 
this burden—especially since the homeless sleeping at the Church 
refused to go to the shelters.291  The Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s grant of a preliminary (and later permanent) injunction against 
the City’s action.292 
A final example is Harbor Missionary Church Corp. v. City of San 
Buenaventura, in which the Ninth Circuit held that the denial of a 
conditional use permit to a church to continue its homeless ministry 
substantially burdened the church’s religious exercise in violation of 
RLUIPA.293  The court found that the district court abused its discretion 
when it held, “without analysis,” that complete denial of the permit was 
the least restrictive means to advance the city’s compelling interest in 
public safety.294  The Church believed its Operation Embrace, which 
provided for both the spiritual and physical needs of the homeless, was 
part of a religious obligation to serve the poor within the physical space 
of the church—literally, under one roof.295  If denied a permit, the 
 
 285. Id. at 546–47.  The court noted that “[z]oning boards have no role to play in telling a 
religious organization how it may practice its religion.”  Id. at 546. 
 286. 293 F.3d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 287. Id. at 572–73. 
 288. Id.  
 289. Id. at 574.  
 290. Id. at 575. 
 291. Id. at 574, 576. 
 292. Id. at 576. 
 293. 642 F. App’x 726, 729–30 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 294. Id. at 730. 
 295. Id. at 727–28.  
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Church itself would have to relocate in order to provide both worship and 
shelter for the homeless in one location.296  The costs involved in 
relocating demonstrated a substantial burden on religious exercise, and 
the City’s grant of the permit with conditions was a less restrictive 
alternative.297  Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of RLUIPA, when 
a church’s only options impose great delays, uncertainty, and expense, a 
substantial burden may be found.298 
While these examples involve church-owned property, service to the 
poor on public property is a bit trickier.  Some churches have succeeded 
in their affirmative claims.299  Without private property, however, other 
religious groups tend to find themselves dependent upon the First 
Amendment protections given to expressive conduct on public property.  
Ordinances that require permits or licenses for outdoor or large group 
feeding must be reasonable as to time, place, and manner.300 
C. The Vulnerabilities of Liberal Affirmative Claims: The Problem of 
Alternatives 
These examples of affirmative acts by religious persons and entities, 
especially aid to the poor and to immigrants, are religiously mandated in 
only the most general sense: you shall love your neighbor, welcome the 
stranger, serve the poor, and the like.  Yet the means by which these 
broader commands are given effect are inherently fluid, indeterminate, 
contextualized, and discretionary: we serve the poor in a particular way 
and particular time and place.  But according to the Free Exercise Clause 
and sister statutes RFRA and RLUIPA, this indeterminacy does not make 
the expression or manifestation any less religious.  The Free Exercise 
 
 296. Id. at 729. 
 297. Id. at 729–30.  The federal district court denied the Church’s motion for a preliminary 
injunction, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.  Id. at 730.  Though the Ninth Circuit agreed that there is a 
compelling interest in public safety and crime prevention, it did not agree that a denial of the permit 
was appropriate.  Id.  The conditions could provide a less restrictive alternative for promoting the 
City’s interests.  See id. 
 298. See id. at 729–30. 
 299. See, e.g., Chosen 300 Ministries, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, No. 12–3159, 2012 WL 
3235317, at *18, *27 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2012) (granting a preliminary injunction based on state 
RFRA against a city policy prohibiting food-sharing with the homeless on 9,200 acres of public 
parks, noting churches had long engaged in this “religious practice”).  
 300. Compare Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1029–30 
(9th Cir. 2006) (giving considerable First Amendment protection as to narrow tailoring to a city 
ordinance, which was amended in the course of litigation to allow noncommercial food distribution 
without permit or license), with First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 
761–62 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding an ordinance requiring a permit for a “large group feeding” was a 
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction). 
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Clause has never been interpreted to limit protection only to “mandatory” 
religious practices.301  Both RFRA and RLUIPA define religious exercise 
capaciously to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not 
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”302  Congress 
provides that this concept “shall be construed in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the 
terms of this chapter and the Constitution.”303  Indeed, the current Free 
Exercise climate has never been more protective of religious claimants.  
The Supreme Court demands respect and equitable treatment for 
religious practice and identity.304  It applies RFRA and RLUIPA strict 
scrutiny in remarkably robust ways.305  Moreover, while Smith’s rational 
basis standard continues to govern where constitutional or statutory strict 
scrutiny is not available, more than half of the states require strict 
scrutiny for religious claims by way of their own statutes or 
constitutions.306 
From the cumulative interpretations of Gonzales, Hobby Lobby, and 
Holt, the Court has concluded that both RFRA and RLUIPA create an 
exemption-friendly jurisprudence.  The statutes “contemplate[] a ‘more 
focused’ inquiry and ‘require[] the Government to demonstrate that the 
compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged 
law ‘to the person’––the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of 
religion is being substantially burdened.’”307  These statutes require 
courts to “‘scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions 
to particular religious claimants’ and ‘to look to the marginal interest in 
enforcing’ the challenged government action in that particular 
context.”308  The upshot is that the government is required “not merely to 
 
 301. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“The determination of what is a 
‘religious’ belief or practice . . . is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or 
practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible 
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
 302. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A) (2018).  RFRA imports RLUIPA’s definition: “The term 
‘exercise of religion’ means religious exercise, as defined in Sec. 2000cc-5 of this title.”  Id. § 
2000bb-2(4). 
 303. Id. § 2000cc–3(g).  
 304. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017–18, 2024 (2017); 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731–32 (2018). 
 305. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707–08 (2014); Holt v. 
Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 369 (2015). 
 306. See Juliet Eilperin, 31 States Have Heightened Religious Freedom Protections, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 1, 2014, 1:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/03/01/where-in-
the-u-s-are-there-heightened-protections-for-religious-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/4TNL-447H] 
(depicting a map of U.S. states with heightened religious freedom protections). 
 307. Holt, 574 U.S. at 362 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726).  
 308. Id. at 363 (quoting Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 726–27). 
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explain why it denied the exemption but to prove that denying the 
exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
governmental interest.”309  In other words, the Court has  assigned an 
onerous task to the government in the strict scrutiny analysis. 
At the same time, the Court has made establishing a substantial 
burden fairly straightforward.  In Hobby Lobby, the Court was clear that 
the rule requiring plaintiffs to engage in conduct they found 
objectionable, together with the costs associated with a refusal to 
comply—hundreds of millions of dollars in fines—created a substantial 
burden.310  As to the argument that the religious beliefs of complicity in 
sinful behavior were too attenuated to be cognizable, the Court said it 
could not engage in a theological analysis.311  A sincerely held belief that 
results in severe penalties is sufficient to establish a substantial burden 
under RFRA.312 
Though Hobby Lobby announced a more lenient approach to 
establishing a substantial burden, the judicial “substantial-burden 
skeptics,” as Professor Michael Helfand calls them,313 continue to set a 
high bar and place obstacles in the way.  Since the 1960s, the substantial 
burden prong of strict scrutiny has been a powerful gatekeeper, 
preventing many claims from ever triggering analysis of the 
government’s interest.314  Indeed, the skeptics continue to view the 
substantial burden prong as a formidable hurdle to overcome, as they 
inquire warily “whether claimants seeking religious accommodations 
have truly experienced a substantial burden on their religious 
exercise.”315 
It is easier to establish a substantial burden with a refusal claim than 
an affirmative claim.316  Conservative religious actors refuse to obey 
government requirements: to perform or pay for an abortion, to provide 
gender confirmation surgery, to retain a transgender employee, to 
dispense emergency contraception, to place a foster child with a same-
 
 309. Id. at 364. 
 310. 573 U.S. at 720–26. 
 311. Id. at 723–24.  
 312. For criticism of this definition of “burden,” see Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens, supra note 
114. 
 313. Michael A. Helfand, Identifying Substantial Burdens, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1771, 1785 
(2016). 
 314. See id. (“This growing substantial-burden skepticism culminated with the Court’s decision 
in Employment Division v. Smith, where the Court eliminated the need to interrogate what burdens 
qualified as legally relevant.”). 
 315. Id. at 1777. 
 316. See infra Section IV.A. 
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sex couple, to bake a wedding cake or arrange flowers for a same-sex 
wedding, to sign the marriage certificate, to give up one’s beliefs or 
identity to qualify for a government benefit.  The refusal itself triggers a 
legal penalty.  Such direct coercive pressure of being forced to act 
against one’s religion, typically under threat of severe penalty, is easily 
seen as burdensome. 
Of course, refusal claimants do not always win, but there is a certain 
rhetorical power to the image of the state compelling a person to act 
against conscience or deeply held convictions.  It is no surprise that the 
free exercise success stories pre- and post-culture wars tended to involve 
refusal claims: the Amish families who refused to send their children to 
school;317 Adele Sherbert318 and Eddie Thomas,319 who refused to 
compromise their religious beliefs to obtain government benefits; the 
Hahn family and the Green family, who refused to provide employee 
insurance coverage for contraceptives they believe are abortifacients;320 
and Abdul Maalik Muhammad, who refused to shave his beard.321 
In my view, it is harder to establish a substantial burden for 
affirmative claims.  Affirmative claims, the current vehicle of 
progressive religious exercise on poverty, immigration, and the 
environment, all require broad latitude to be free from legal restraint.  
But judicial skeptics view with suspicion the claim that one must, as a 
matter of religious conviction, provide sanctuary to the undocumented, 
feed and shelter the poor in church, or use property in a way that reduces 
the carbon footprint.  Some skeptics inquire whether the claim is political 
or philosophical, not religious.322  Questions like this emerge even 
though the Court has repeated for nearly forty years that “religious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to 
others,”323 and the plausibility or reasonableness of a religious claim may 
not be investigated.324 
Most significantly, substantial-burden skeptics ask whether the 
 
 317. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 318. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963). 
 319. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 711 (1981). 
 320. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 700–02 (2014). 
 321. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 355 (2015). 
 322. See, e.g., Stephanie Acosta Inks, Immigration Law’s Looming RFRA Problem Can Be 
Solved by RFRA, 2019 BYU L. REV. 107, 121–24 (noting how sometimes sanctuary is viewed not as 
religious but as disagreement with government policy). 
 323. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714. 
 324. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 724; see also Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens, supra note 114, at 
115–17 (noting courts are not permitted to address the “religious question” and must instead use 
neutral principles). 
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religious claimant has alternatives.  This concern renders affirmative 
(and therefore liberal) claims vulnerable because countless interactions 
between law and religious exercise offer myriad ways to serve the poor, 
help the immigrant, and protect the environment.  Why do it this way and 
not another?  Did the law truly create a burden, or did the religious actors 
have options that fell within the bounds of the law?325  Are the conflicts 
of their own making?  As Professor Helfand has written in a different 
context, but relevant for this point: 
A law imposes a substantial burden because it leaves the aggrieved 
party with limited options for engaging in religious exercise.  In a case 
of a substantial burden, the only option that remains to engage in 
religious exercise is to incur some sort of significant civil sanction, tax, 
or penalty.  And in leaving only such an option, the law has thereby 
imposed a substantial burden that is triggered by religious exercise.326 
If the very definition of burden relies on being trapped by law or 
government policy with no way out, then many affirmative claims will 
not make the cut.  These claims seek to protect decisions regarding the 
means by which broad religious commands are given effect—decisions 
that may emerge from an indeterminate, fluid, contextualized, and 
discretionary process. 
The affirmative claimant makes a decision to manifest her faith in a 
particular way.  Once that decision—an inherently religious act—is 
made, a court should be bound to ask whether the law that restrains that 
act of faith substantially burdens her religious exercise.  Instead, 
substantial-burden skeptics ask whether any options existed in the first 
instance—indeed, whether the claimant was under an inescapable 
compulsion to make the decision she made.327  By way of example, 
consider the prosecutions of clergy and other church members during the 
1980s Sanctuary Movement.  Accused of felony transportation of 
 
 325. See, e.g., United States v. Epstein, 91 F. Supp. 3d 573, 581 (D.N.J. 2015) (“One way to 
qualitatively assess the burden that a government practice places on religious exercise is to consider 
whether an adherent has acceptable alternative means to practice his religion.”); Oklevueha Native 
Am. Church of Haw., Inc. v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[Plaintiffs] have 
produced no evidence that denying [Native Americans] cannabis forces them to choose between 
religious obedience and government sanction, since they have stated in no uncertain terms that many 
other substances including peyote are capable of serving the exact same religious function as 
cannabis.”). 
 326. Helfand, supra note 313, at 1805 (emphasis added).  
 327. To establish a substantial burden, some courts require the claimant to show that the law 
requires what is forbidden or forbids what is required, even though Supreme Court jurisprudence 
and the statutory text of RFRA and RLUIPA explicitly consider it possible to substantially burden 
religious exercise that is not central to or mandated by religion. 
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undocumented persons, these sanctuary workers claimed a free exercise 
defense.328  Courts would not find a burden where legal alternatives were 
available: 
Representatives of Catholic and Methodist clergy testified at the 
pretrial hearing and at trial.  None suggested that devout Christian 
belief mandates participation in the “sanctuary movement.”  Obviously, 
appellants could have assisted beleaguered El Salvadorans in many 
ways which did not affront the border control laws: they could have 
collected and distributed monetary and other donations, aided in 
preparing petitions for legal entry and assisted El Salvadorans legally in 
this country, or, in the Christian missionary tradition, they could have 
performed their ministry in El Salvador or neighboring countries where 
El Salvadorans are refugees.  They chose confrontational, illegal means 
to practice their religious views—the “burden” was voluntarily 
assumed and not imposed on them by the government.329 
Similarly, in the land use context, courts have found that alternatives 
vitiate the existence of a burden.  In pre-RLUIPA zoning cases, the 
existence of possible “alternative locations”––areas in the municipality 
with more hospitable zoning––was typically fatal to a church’s claim.330  
Imagine a court saying that Western Presbyterian Church or First 
Presbyterian Church had lots of options for serving the poor in other 
parts of town that did not involve bringing homeless individuals to 
affluent neighborhoods: they could have sheltered them elsewhere, or 
even collected money to help.  One need not go far to find such cases.  In 
Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Dayton Beach331 and in First 
Assembly of God of Naples, Florida, Inc. v. Collier County, Florida,332 
courts upheld denials of permission to serve the homeless because the 
churches could (at least theoretically) operate these ministries in other 
parts of the municipality.  And today, even with RLUIPA’s express 
intent to provide generous and robust protection of religious land use, 
 
 328. See United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Elder, 601 
F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (S.D. Tex. 1985). 
 329. Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956 (emphasis added); see also Elder, 601 F. Supp. at 1580 (“[N]othing 
in this decision prohibits the exercise of Christian charity to those who present themselves before the 
[U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS)] to apply for asylum and who proceed under 
INS rules.” (citing United States v. Pereira-Pineda, 721 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.1983)). 
 330. See Angela C. Carmella, RLUIPA: Linking Religion, Land Use, Ownership and the 
Common Good, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 485, 493–94 (2009). 
 331. 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1560 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding no substantial burden because the 
Church failed to show the city code prohibited homeless shelters from all zones in the City of 
Dayton). 
 332. 20 F.3d 419, 423 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding the ordinance at issue facially neutral because it 
defined areas where shelters could operate). 
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some courts still require claimants to demonstrate a lack of acceptable 
alternative properties.333 
One might be tempted to argue that the Supreme Court recently 
abandoned the reliance on the “alternatives,” so even if once common, 
this consideration will disappear in time.  It is true that the Court has 
spoken negatively about alternatives as a basis for discussing free 
exercise claims.  First, the Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
considered the argument that the employers could avoid the burden on 
their beliefs simply by not providing any health insurance to 
employees.334  The Court found that even this alternative created a 
substantial burden under RFRA because of severe financial penalties and 
disadvantage in the employee marketplace.335  A year later, in Holt v. 
Hobbs, the Court considered the notion of alternatives more directly 
under RLUIPA.336  In that case, Muslim prisoner Muhammad refused to 
shave his beard as required by the prison’s grooming policy, but he 
offered to keep his beard to a half-inch.337  The Court found that the 
lower court erred when it concluded that the prison’s grooming policy 
did not substantially burden Muhammad’s religious exercise because “he 
had been provided a prayer rug and a list of distributors of Islamic 
material, he was allowed to correspond with a religious advisor, and was 
allowed to maintain the required diet and observe religious holidays.”338  
The Court clarified that “RLUIPA’s ‘substantial burden’ inquiry asks 
whether the government has substantially burdened religious exercise 
(here, the growing of a [half]-inch beard), not whether the RLUIPA 
claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise.”339 
But these recent Supreme Court statements, made in the context of 
refusal claims, do not directly address the issue of alternatives as they 
 
 333. Carmella, Land Use, supra note 269, at 520–21.  Some courts take available alternative 
locations into account, but others do not.  Id.; Lisa Mathews, Hobby Lobby and Hobbs to the 
Rescue: Clarifying RLUIPA’s Confusing Substantial Burden Test for Land-Use Cases, 24 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1025, 1041 (2017) (noting “broad disagreement” among courts on the significance 
of “availability of other land”).  See, e.g., San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 
1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding the city regulations at issue did not “render religious exercise 
effectively impracticable” because, inter alia, the record contained no evidence demonstrating the 
college was “precluded from using other sites within the city”).  Churches that get approval for some 
part, but not all, of their affirmative claims, or receive conditional approval, may have difficulty 
establishing a burden.  Carmella, Land Use, supra note 269, at 520–21.   
 334. 73 U.S. 682, 720–23 (2014).  Neither party raised this issue, but the Court still chose to 
address it.  See id. 
 335. Id. at 722–23. 
 336. 574 U.S. 352, 361–62 (2015).   
 337. Id. at 352. 
 338. Id. at 361. 
 339. Id. at 361–62. 
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arise in the context of progressive affirmative claims.  In Hobby Lobby, 
the Court still considered the alternative, and then rejected it because it 
generated severe burdens of its own.340  This suggests that a tolerable 
alternative might have been persuasive, even in a refusal context.  
Moreover, Holt is forged in the prison context, where prisoners are 
dependent upon prison administrators for every aspect of religious 
exercise.  The Court made clear that a prison, given the highly controlled 
setting, cannot say that the prisoner has had enough religious exercise by 
accommodating some but not other practices.341  Even skeptical courts 
have not told religious liberals that worship and prayer are enough; 
rather, these courts ask whether the affirmative act can take alternative 
forms or be accomplished in alternative locations so as not to conflict 
with law.342  The discussions of alternatives in Hobby Lobby and Holt do 
not speak to the issue of the indeterminacy and fluidity of affirmative 
claims.  Nevertheless, Thomas, and its application in Hobby Lobby and 
Holt, arguably continues to provide a powerful example against the 
argument that alternatives necessarily undermine the burden.  In those 
cases, the Court readily deferred to the religious claimant’s judgment 
about what faith required, which works for the progressive claimant just 
as it does for the traditionalist one. 
Yet even with such judicial deference, the work of a new wave of 
judicial skeptics trying to narrow federal statutes343 can render 
affirmative claims vulnerable to the great variety of “substantial burden” 
approaches across the federal courts of appeals as well as state courts.  
Because RFRA and RLUIPA do not explicitly define what constitutes a 
substantial burden, circuits have been open to multiple interpretations, 
which range from quite lenient to nearly impossible to establish.344  Some 
require a showing that religious exercise is “effectively impracticable.”345  
 
 340. See 573 U.S. at 720–23. 
 341. See Holt, 574 U.S. at 361. 
 342. See supra notes 313–33 and accompanying text. 
 343. See Helfand, supra note 313, at 1785 (explaining that substantial-burden skepticism has led 
“many federal courts” to interpret “RFRA’s provisions that limited the category of what qualified as 
a substantial burden” in a way that defines a “substantial burden” as one that “implicate[s] central 
tenants of the claimant’s faith” or that “compel[s] conduct that violate[s] a claimant’s faith”).  
 344. See Mathews, supra note 333, at 1036–42 (explaining the differing approaches the federal 
circuit courts have utilized in determining what constitutes a “substantial burden”); see also Rodrigo 
L. Silva, Reckoning RLUIPA’s Substantial Burden Provision, 8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 127, 142–49 
(2014) (explaining that the circuit courts tend to use one of three approaches: narrowly defining 
“substantial burden,” requiring “more than an inconvenience on religious exercise,” or broadly 
defining “substantial burden”). 
 345. Carmella, Land Use, supra note 269, at 516 (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. 
City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
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Others say a claimant must demonstrate that the law imposes a 
“significantly great restriction.”346  Some require a showing of 
“significant pressure which directly coerces the [claimants] to conform 
[their conduct to the law].”347  Others use a multi-factor test.348  And for 
all of these, the decisions are sensitive to specific facts.349  Indeed, the 
definition of substantial burden can be so restrictive as to exclude 
 
 346. Id. at 517 (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 
2006)). 
 347. Id. (quoting Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 
2004)). 
 348. See id. (explaining that in Roman Catholic Bishop, the First Circuit “identif[ied] some 
relevant factors” to find a substantial burden including “whether the regulation is arbitrary, 
capricious,  or unlawful or targets religious practices or groups in a hostile way and whether the 
process, though facially neutral, will necessarily produce a negative result for the religious 
applicant.” (citing Roman Catholic Bishop v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 96–97 (1st Cir. 
2013))); The Tenth Circuit applied a different set of factors: 
[A] government act imposes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise if it: (1) 
“requires participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief,” (2) 
“prevents participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief,” or (3) 
“places substantial pressure on an adherent . . . to engage in conduct contrary to a 
sincerely held religious belief.” 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1138 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Abdulhaseeb 
v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010)), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).  The Third Circuit found that a substantial burden exists if: 
(1) “[A] follower is forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and 
forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other[s] . . . versus abandoning one of 
the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit;” or (2) “the government puts 
substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his behavior and to violate his 
beliefs.”  
Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 304 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Washington v. Klem, 497 
F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007)).  As Lyng said, there is no need for direct coercion; “indirect coercion 
or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny.”  
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988).  The Ninth Circuit noted 
that “[u]nder RFRA, a ‘substantial burden’ is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose 
between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit (Sherbert) or 
coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions (Yoder).”  
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1069–70 (9th Cir. 2008).  
 349. Carmella, Land Use, supra note 269, at 519.  Courts typically use an objective standard for 
the question of law on what constitutes a substantial burden, although on occasion a court defers to 
the claimant’s subjective determination.  See, e.g., World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of 
Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2009) (assuming that “whether a burden is substantial” is a 
question of fact and that “substantiality is a relative term—whether a given burden is substantial 
depends on its magnitude in relation to the needs and resources of the religious organization in 
question”).  In certain circumstances, affirmative claims may not even be cognizable as, for example, 
when a claimant points to the government penalty itself as the source of the burden.  See Tyms-Bey 
v. State, 69 N.E.3d 488, 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“[T]he relevant ‘means,’ for purposes of RFRA, 
is the ‘burden’ the party hopes to avoid, not the sanction imposed for ignoring that burden.”).  The 
substantial burden must be separate from the particular type of enforcement.  For instance, the 
requirement to pay taxes might burden one’s religion, not the fines or imprisonment for failing to 
pay them.  Id.  Further, a less restrictive alternative must accommodate the religious practice, not 
lessen severity of the restriction.  See id. (citing United States v. Christie, 825 F.3d 1048, 1061–62 
(9th Cir. 2016)). 
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“[m]any of the very situations that Congress intended to include within 
the statutes’ reach.”350 
D. Another Vulnerability: Unrecognized Claims Due to Lack of 
Coercion 
Some religious claims, even those that involve severe impacts on 
religion, are not cognizable in court.  Courts require coercion as a 
threshold for constitutional and statutory free exercise claims.351  Refusal 
claims and most affirmative claims meet this requirement.  But 
affirmative claims of Native Americans often do not. 
The religious practices of Native American tribes are protected, if at 
all, by a complex web of treaty, constitutional, and statutory laws.352  
Though it is difficult to generalize the religious practices of numerous 
individual tribes, it is safe to say that their religious claims arise most 
commonly in one of two ways: either to allow ceremonial practices or to 
protect sacred lands.  As to ceremonial practices, federal statutes exempt 
members of the Native American Church who ingest the illegal drug 
peyote as a sacrament353 and permit the taking of bald eagles and their 
feathers, which is otherwise unlawful, for ritual purposes.354 
As to federally owned lands, like national park lands, trust lands, and 
sacred sites, Native Americans enjoy access.  But if a tribe claims that a 
particular government program makes it harder for it to practice its 
religion, it has not met the coercion requirement.355  In Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the Supreme Court denied a claim for 
protection from a paved road and timber foresting on sacred lands.356  
The tribes argued that “disruption of the natural environment . . . will 
diminish the sacredness of the area in question” and impair their 
 
 350. Brief of Amici Curiae Religious Liberty Law Scholars in Support of Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at 10, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 556 U.S. 1281 (2009) (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 
318196 [hereinafter Brief of Religious Liberty Law Scholars]. 
 351. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (“[A] 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion . . . .”). 
 352. See Religious Liberty Guidance Document, supra note 150, at 17a. 
 353. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2018). 
 354. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2018). 
 355. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988) 
(“[I]ndirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion . . . are subject to scrutiny under the 
First Amendment. . . .  This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government 
programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency 
to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring 
forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.”). 
 356. Id. at 453.  
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religious practices.357  Although the tribes experienced these impacts as 
severe restraints on religious practices, the Court denied the claim, 
holding that government coercion must exist for there to be a 
constitutionally cognizable burden to religious exercise.358  Here, the 
government conceded the possibility of “devastating effects on 
traditional Indian religious practices.”359  Nevertheless, the Court decided 
that no burden could be found because the government’s action did not 
coerce anyone “into violating their religious beliefs” or “penalize 
religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, 
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.”360  The Court 
reasoned that access to sacred sites on federal lands is sufficient; the 
government has no responsibility to ensure the quality of religious 
experience.361  Government must mandate, prohibit, or penalize religious 
exercise as a prerequisite to demonstrating a burden on religious 
exercise.362 
One can understand this threshold inquiry in the context of Western 
faiths.  Imagine religiously conservative parents arguing that the 
existence of same-sex married couples makes it harder to raise children 
in a wholesome, faith-filled environment, or a religiously liberal business 
owner arguing that lax federal pollution levels are immoral and place her 
business at an economic disadvantage because she follows stricter limits.  
No court would entertain the free exercise claims of those parents or that 
business owner.363  These impacts are byproducts of legislation and 
regulation.  In the context of land-based faiths, however, the coercion 
requirement makes it nearly impossible to seek free exercise protection 
even from severe religious impairment caused directly by government 
 
 357. Id. at 448. 
 358. Id. at 450–51. 
 359. Id. at 451. 
 360. Id. at 449.  
 361. See id. at 451–52. 
 362. See id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining the majority’s position “that federal 
land-use decisions that render the practice of a given religion impossible do not burden that religion 
in a manner cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause, because such decisions neither coerce 
conduct inconsistent with religious belief nor penalize religious activity”).  Some have argued that 
RFRA’s passage affected Lyng’s continued relevance.  See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
535 F.3d 1058, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
 363. The argument was made and rejected in parochial school funding cases that the use of tax 
revenues to subsidize secular activities of religious schools violated the Free Exercise Clause.  See, 
e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 674–77, 689 (1971) (holding that grants given to parochial 
colleges to construct new facilities did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the funds were 
used for secular purposes).  The Court was “unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice 
or exercise of their religious beliefs.”  Id. at 689. 
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land management programs.364  Many federal statutes require upfront 
consideration of the cultural and religious needs of native peoples,365 but 
these tend to be ineffective in avoiding religious harms.  Justice 
Brennan’s approach, set out in his Lyng dissent, provided an obvious 
answer: government action that “frustrates or inhibits religious practice” 
passes the threshold for coercion.366 
IV.  RELIGIOUS LIBERALS IN THE TRUMP ERA: THE USE OF LITIGATION 
As noted in the previous section, religious liberals have been actively 
involved in lobbying and litigation for the past fifty years, with 
increasing frequency.  Indeed, even on the eve of Trump’s election, it 
was noted: 
[P]rogressives are now leveraging the First Amendment principle as a 
vehicle to advance causes of their own.  As they see it, social action is 
integral to living out their faith, and local ordinances can’t take away 
their rights.  In the name of religious freedom, activists are defying 
local resistance to their campaigns for social change.  They’re pressing 
ahead, for instance, with plans to install solar panels over a local 
board’s objections in Massachusetts and to establish tent cities for the 
homeless in California and Michigan.367 
Since the 2016 election, however, some progressive religious causes 
have become even more prominent as a direct result of Trump’s policies, 
particularly those dealing with the immigration crisis.368 
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person in a position that is even worse than enduring a substantial burden; they are 
actually coercing a person’s failure to engage in religious exercise. 
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 365. Connie Rogers, Native American Consultation in Resource Development on Federal Lands, 
COLO. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 113, 113. 
 366. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The dissent argued that the constitutional 
guarantee of free exercise “is directed against any form of governmental action that frustrates or 
inhibits religious practice.”  Id. 
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NEWS SERV. (Aug. 26, 2016), https://religionnews.com/2016/08/26/progressives-embrace-religious-
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PBS (July 8, 2019, 5:27 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/religious-liberals-want-to-
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As a general matter, religious liberals do not have a coordinated 
strategy, nor do they have religious liberty law firms to represent their 
causes.  But think tanks and law professors have become involved in 
some recent litigation,369 which may signal a move toward a more 
comprehensive approach.  Indeed, some religious liberals and legal 
scholars thinking strategically about religious freedom in the Trump era 
may attempt to mirror the successes of conservative free exercise claims 
by bringing or defending lawsuits that seek religious exemptions for 
progressive causes.  Several scholars contend that RFRA could provide a 
strong argument for the protection of sanctuary churches, based upon 
cases like Gonzales, Hobby Lobby, and Holt, which have dramatically 
altered the legal landscape in favor of religious claimants.370  Another 
scholar notes that RFRA could provide support for Native American 
land-based claims because Hobby Lobby explicitly held that RFRA broke 
free from the pre-Smith jurisprudence, which “clearly opens the door for 
rethinking . . . that Lyng is a reliable controlling decision for the 
substantial burden analysis.”371  Yet another scholar has argued that 
religion-protective statutes could be used against restrictive abortion laws 
because legal access to abortion could be part of one’s religious 
exercise.372  A religious exemption from an abortion prohibition was 
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precisely the reason the Catholic bishops opposed the passage of 
RFRA;373 no one else at the time seriously considered the likelihood of 
such a claim.374  But it remains to be seen whether the broad religious 
liberty principles set out in the Attorney General’s Guidance Document 
will protect progressive causes, given the vulnerabilities of affirmative 
claims. 
Since the Trump election, the record on progressive claims under 
RFRA and RLUIPA (and state counterparts) has been mixed.  Most of 
the cases involve affirmative claims, with their added complexity on the 
substantial burden analysis.  On private property, religious claims 
succeed and fail.  Even where they fail, progressives sometimes prevail 
for other reasons.375  On public property, Native American claims 
continue to fail because of the absence of coercion.376  And religious 
claims on both kinds of property continue to encounter the argument of 
“available legal alternatives,” which some courts accept and others 
reject.377 
A. Refusal Claims: The Hobby Lobby Formulation of the Substantial 
Burden 
Two recent cases involve religious protest—refusal claims—against 
federal eminent domain action on private property.  In Adorers of the 
Blood of Christ v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, a religious 
order of Catholic nuns sued to prevent a taking of an easement through 
their land for purposes of installing part of a gas pipeline known as the 
Atlantic Sunrise Pipeline.378  The Federal Energy Regulatory 
 
contraception and abortion is essential to the exercise of that belief. . . .  If the owners of Hobby 
Lobby have a judicially-recognized religious belief that they must provide insurance coverage for 
their employees (and therefore cannot simply provide no insurance and pay the tax instead to avoid 
the contraceptive coverage requirement), then it seems plausible that a business owner might just as 
well have a religious belief that he or she must provide insurance coverage that includes coverage for 
abortion to their employees.” (footnote omitted)). 
 373. House Hearings, supra note 72, at 33–35, 40–43 (statement of Mark E. Chopko, Gen. 
Counsel, United States Catholic Conference); id. at 270–307 (statement of James Bopp, Jr., Gen. 
Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.); Senate Hearing, supra note 72, at 99–115 
(statement of Mark E. Chopko, Gen. Counsel, United States Catholic Conference); id. at 203–37 
(statement of James Bopp, Jr., Gen. Counsel, National Right to Life Committee, Inc.). 
 374. See Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 236 n.166 (1994). 
 375. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.1, and IV.B.2. 
 376. See infra Section IV.C.1. 
 377. See infra Sections IV.B.1, IV.B.2, and IV.C.2. 
 378. 283 F. Supp. 3d 342, 343 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff’d, 897 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 
139 S. Ct. 1169 (2019) (mem.). 
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Commission (FERC) authorized a private company, Transco, to take and 
use private property all along the planned pipeline corridor, including the 
order’s property.379  The nuns sought a preliminary injunction against 
pipeline construction, arguing that FERC’s authorization of the taking, 
and the taking itself, violated RFRA.380 
The Adorers sought to establish a substantial burden on their 
religious exercise.381  They argued that their “religious practice includes 
protecting and preserving creation, which they believe is a revelation of 
GOD, the sacredness of which must be honored and protected for future 
generations.”382  The Adorers, who followed Pope Francis’s encyclical 
letter, Laudato Si’,383 alleged the pipeline construction “would interfere 
with their ability to use their land in a manner consistent with their 
religious beliefs.”384  They argued that drilling and extracting natural gas 
could cause methane to leak, which “would contribute to global warming 
in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs,” and harm the earth and all 
of humanity.385 
The district court did not reach the merits of the RFRA claim, instead 
dismissing it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that 
the Natural Gas Act provides a specific and exclusive process for 
reviewing FERC decisions, which involves a rehearing of FERC orders 
in appellate courts.386  The Adorers missed their opportunity to raise the 
RFRA issue earlier in the rehearing process.387  The Third Circuit 
affirmed,388 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.389 
At the heart of the national debate over immigration and refugees is 
another federal eminent domain action.  A Texas church refused to allow 
agents onto its property to survey and take land for part of the Trump 
administration’s border wall.390  The government sought a temporary 
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easement over two parcels, totaling about sixty-five acres, owned by the 
Diocese of Brownsville to survey the land and prepare it for the wall’s 
construction.391  One of the parcels, next to a Catholic high school, is 
undeveloped.392  The other is the site of La Lomita Chapel, an active 
place of worship for the Catholic community for over one hundred 
years.393  The Diocese was concerned that if the wall were built in its 
designated location, it would turn a tranquil environment into that of an 
enforcement zone.394  Further, given the likelihood of interrogation and 
detention for anyone suspected of not being a citizen, worshipers—even 
those legally in the U.S.—would stay away.395  The Diocese, concerned 
that this would significantly change worship life at the chapel, refused to 
consent to the easement.396  The federal government sued, moving for 
immediate possession.397 
In the Diocese’s brief opposing the motion, Bishop Daniel Flores 
stated the rationale for the refusal.  First, as to the foreseeable 
interference with worship, the Diocese relied on RFRA and its broad 
interpretation in Hobby Lobby to argue that “the proposed border 
wall . . . would substantially burden the exercise of religious beliefs at La 
Lomita Chapel.”398  He wrote, “[I]f I were to consent to any actions that 
would culminate in the construction of the wall, I would be facilitating 
an activity that I view to be contrary to my religious and moral 
obligations as the head of the Diocese.”399  Second, the diocese argued 
that the border wall itself is contrary to Catholic teaching, so that “it 
cannot, as a matter of Catholic faith in practice, participate in the 
building of a border wall that is contrary to the Diocese’s sincerely held 
religious beliefs.”400  “[T]he Diocese cannot consent to the erection of a 
physical symbol of division and dehumanization on its [p]roperty, 
 
7:18CV00329 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Brownsville Diocese’s Brief].  
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especially where there are alternative means of patrolling the border.”401 
A federal district court found that allowing a few surveyors on the 
church’s property did not constitute a substantial burden under RFRA.402  
The litigation ended in February of 2019, when Democrats in Congress 
were able to obtain an exemption for the Chapel property and other 
sensitive properties as part of negotiations on the spending bill to fund 
the border wall.403 
Had the courts in the Adorers’ and Brownsville Diocese’s lawsuits 
reached the merits, RFRA might have protected them, especially given 
the added protection of private property ownership.404  Even had these 
claimants not succeeded, they should have been able to establish a 
substantial burden, given the similarities to Hobby Lobby.  Indeed, the 
Brownsville Diocese’s argument regarding substantial burden is framed 
precisely as that in Hobby Lobby: the placement of the border wall on 
church property would “demand[] that [the Diocese] engage in conduct 
that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”405  To consent to the border 
wall on church property, like providing contraception coverage, would 
be to facilitate activity directly contrary to its beliefs.406  Not to consent, 
and to have the wall placed coercively on the property, would force the 
church into maintaining a structure on its own property that is contrary to 
its beliefs.  Additionally, the church would be involved in an ongoing 
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relationship with the government, requiring constant surveillance of 
church activity, since the wall plus a gate (as was proposed) would be 
within an enforcement zone.407  This would clearly deter worshipers from 
coming to the chapel.408  It seems that RFRA, as interpreted by Hobby 
Lobby—with great deference to the claimant’s formulation of its 
burden409—could have protected the Diocese from the taking of church 
property for a use that directly and symbolically violates its beliefs.410  
Some liberals who were critical of Hobby Lobby may, on second 
thought, find the decision contains the seeds of a new growth of 
progressive free exercise claims. 
B. Affirmative Claims on Private Property 
As I have maintained, affirmative claims often do not fare as well as 
refusal claims.  Skeptical courts are more suspicious of claims that are 
indeterminate, discretionary, and fluid.  These affirmative claims vary 
widely and can involve countless interactions with law.  It may be 
difficult to establish a substantial burden because the claimant might 
have alternatives, or the claim itself might be perceived as more political 
than religious.  But one thing that does help to root these claims is when 
the affirmative acts are undertaken on privately-owned property.  The 
following cases involve sanctuary and humanitarian aid to undocumented 
persons, charitable services to the poor, and green building uses, all 
involving religious claims for activity located on church-owned property. 
1. Sanctuary and Humanitarian Aid to the Undocumented 
Churches use their property for more than worship, sometimes 
providing sanctuary to undocumented immigrants.  The Trump 
administration’s immigration enforcement, which includes swift 
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deportation and family separation,411 has re-energized the New Sanctuary 
Movement, with over a thousand houses of worship participating.412  The 
detention of children and relentless pursuit of undocumented immigrants 
throughout the nation, even those fully immersed in communities, have 
moved these churches to act on the biblical imperatives of welcoming the 
stranger and upholding human dignity.413  ICE’s “large-scale practice of 
conducting immigration raids at Christian churches” involves the arrest 
of undocumented persons as they leave church.414  This has prompted 
further religious mobilization.415 
It is unclear whether government interference in sanctuary efforts 
would constitute a substantial burden under RFRA.416  In contrast to the 
Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s, houses of worship now are more 
likely to openly declare themselves sanctuaries for undocumented 
immigrants, while at the same time not ensuring protection from 
immigration authorities.417  Clergy believe that RFRA and the Fourth 
Amendment protect this exercise of religion on their private property,418 
so they are prepared to allow ICE agents to enter church property as long 
as they have arrest warrants.419  When a church provides sanctuary 
openly, without blocking warrant-bearing ICE agents, it seems that it 
violates no law.420  But since 2017, the Trump administration has 
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pledged a more aggressive enforcement of the harboring statute.421  If in 
a given case the harboring provisions were triggered, churches and their 
clergy may have difficulty establishing a substantial burden.  In the 
1980s, courts rejected free exercise defenses to the enforcement of 
harboring provisions in part because the Christian faith did not require 
participation in the sanctuary movement.422  Without an absolute 
mandate, the existence of legal alternatives became crucial to the 
analysis.423  Now, even though religiously motivated acts fall explicitly 
within RFRA’s ambit, legal alternatives may nevertheless reduce the 
magnitude of the burden.  One scholar, recognizing this vulnerability, 
has shown how a church can legitimately argue that it has no option but 
to provide sanctuary: 
If a congregation saw sanctuary as no more than one of several 
perfectly equivalent means of performing their duty of care to others, 
the burden might not be substantial.  Substantial burdens would still 
likely exist where congregations thought that there was something 
unique about sanctuary, such that a congregation did not feel there was 
another way to fulfill their obligations.  This might be particularly stark 
along the border, where humanitarian activists face the question of 
turning away migrants in physical distress or in need of food and 
water.424 
This suggests that a church must build a strong case to establish that it 
was under religious compulsion to act in a particular way—not 
compelled by specific church rule but by the intensity of the commitment 
to broad church teaching and the exigencies of time, circumstances, and 
place.  This is just another way of saying that the church must 
demonstrate that it makes a theological determination regarding the 
means by which it will inculturate the broad teachings of its faith, like 
welcoming the stranger or loving one’s neighbor. 
Other churches use their property not for sanctuary but as a staging 
 
follow the procedures it would for any home: get a warrant”). 
 421. See Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., to All Fed. Prosecutors (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/956841/download [https://perma.cc/S5LM-ZMAB]. 
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participation in the ‘sanctuary movement.’”); cf. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 694 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
 423. See, e.g., Merkt, 794 F.2d at 956 (“Obviously, appellants could have assisted beleaguered El 
Salvadorans in many ways which did not affront the border control laws . . . .  They chose 
confrontational, illegal means to practice their religious views––the ‘burden’ was voluntarily 
assumed and not imposed on them by the government.”). 
 424. Scott-Railton, supra note 370, at 472 (emphasis added). 
600 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
area for charitable efforts for undocumented immigrants.  Crossing the 
southwest border is profoundly dangerous.  Many have died in the 
process, and those who survive still often suffer exhaustion, dehydration, 
heatstroke, and other ills from the arduous trek.425  A ministry of the 
Unitarian Universalist Church of Tucson, known as No More Deaths, has 
organized to offer humanitarian aid in the desert and to find the bodies of 
those who have died.426  The ministry operates out of a building known 
as the Barn in Ajo, Arizona.427  Border Patrol agents began surveilling 
the Barn after No More Deaths released a report criticizing the agency.428  
In January 2018, Border Patrol agents arrested Dr. Scott Warren, an 
active volunteer with No More Deaths, when he assisted two 
undocumented persons at the Barn.429  He was charged with one count of 
criminal conspiracy to transport and harbor illegal aliens and two counts 
of harboring,430 the basis of which “include[d] providing food, water, 
shelter, and clean clothes to, as well as talking to, two undocumented 
migrants.”431  Dr. Warren, for whom “humanitarian aid is a ‘sacred 
act,’”432 testified that his faith “requires him to care for people that he 
believes are in distress.”433 
Dr. Warren moved to dismiss the charges under RFRA.434  In a 
December 2018 order, a magistrate judge denied the motion.435  The 
magistrate judge based his decision on an evidentiary hearing he presided 




 425. Paul Ingram, Prosecutors Argue No More Deaths Volunteer Conspired to Protect 2 Men in 
Country Illegally, TUCSON SENTINEL (May 29, 2019, 4:46 PM), http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/ 
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desert between 2000 and 2018).  
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 429. Id. 
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 431. Brief of and by Professors of Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 13, United States v. Warren, No. CR-18-00223-001-TUC-RCC, 2018 WL 
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 432. Id. at 6 n.2.   
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 434. United States v. Warren, No. MJ-17-0341-TUC-BPV, 2018 WL 6809430, at *2 (D. Ariz. 
Dec. 27, 2018).   
 435. Id. at *5. 
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establish a substantial burden because: 
At no time during the Defendant’s testimony did he claim that his 
religious beliefs necessitated he aid undocumented migrants, only that 
he was compelled to aid persons in distress. . . .  Nor has he asserted or 
testified that his beliefs require he assist people illegally in this country 
to evade apprehension or reach their ultimate destination.437 
The magistrate judge focused on whether Dr. Warren’s beliefs compelled 
him to actively and directly violate this law.438  Dr. Warren failed in that 
regard, because his beliefs only compelled him to provide humanitarian 
aid.439  Presumably, under the court’s reasoning, Dr. Warren had legal 
alternatives: since Dr. Warren was not compelled to help these particular 
men in this particular place and in this particular way, he could have 
worked at a soup kitchen or helped in any number of other ways to live 
out his religious beliefs. 
The magistrate judge misapprehended the nature of the affirmative 
claim.  The magistrate judge ignored the context and found that the 
criminal statutes did not specifically compel Dr. Warren “to do anything 
in violation of his religious beliefs.”440  Notice how the magistrate judge 
imposes a refusal claim model on an affirmative claim.  The harboring 
law did not mandate any particular action; rather, it restrained Dr. 
Warren’s religious action.441  Affirmative acts restrained by law are by 
definition broader than the acts involved in refusal claims because refusal 
claims are determined by what the law requires, while affirmative claims 
are determined by what the religion teaches. 
Though affirmative claims and refusal claims arise from different 
faith-law interactions, the conflict between faith and law for affirmative 
claims is no less direct than for refusal claims.  The law professors’ 
amicus brief criticized the magistrate judge’s determination as a 
complete misreading of Supreme Court precedent when it noted that 
“[t]he question is not whether defendant’s religious beliefs commit him 
to violate the law, but whether his beliefs commit him to undertake acts 
that are otherwise treated as illegal” under the law.442  Because “[t]he 
bases for Dr. Warren’s charges are entirely RFRA-protected activities,” 
his prosecution gave him the choice of either “violating his religious 
 
 437. Warren, 2018 WL 5257807, at *2. 
 438. See id. 
 439. Id. 
 440. Id.  
 441. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2018).  
 442. Warren Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 431, at 12. 
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beliefs or risking criminal prosecution—undoubtedly a substantial 
burden.”443 
While his RFRA defense was unsuccessful, Dr. Warren was 
ultimately acquitted in a retrial after a first trial ended in a deadlocked 
jury,444 which suggests the jury was troubled by the way in which the 
prosecution criminalized humanitarian assistance.  It further suggests 
moral ambivalence toward government surveillance of private property 
that is dedicated to such works. 
2. Charitable Works and Environmental Stewardship at the Local Level 
As we saw above in cases like Western Presbyterian v. Board of 
Zoning Adjustment of District of Columbia445 and Harbor Missionary 
Church v. City of San Buenaventura,446 churches continue to need 
regulatory latitude to serve the poor on their properties.  With the 
passage of RLUIPA in 2000,447 federal law began to protect religious 
land uses at the local level.  The statute has become a powerful deterrent 
to municipal discrimination and mishandling of religiously affiliated 
applicants.  Yet the courts continue to apply the substantial burden prong 
in varied ways. 
One thread of cases has been quite solicitous of the provision of 
charitable works.  A recent case illustrating this continued solicitude, 
Ward v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County,448 
involved the Nashville Methodist Church.  In alliance with an interfaith 
housing organization, the church received an accommodation from strict 
application of a zoning code in order to construct transitional housing 
(twenty-two micro-homes) for homeless persons on church property.449  
Aggrieved neighbors sued to stop the development, but the Tennessee 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, which held that the zoning 
board’s decision to accommodate the church was not arbitrary or 
capricious.450  The court found that both the church and the interfaith 
organization were motivated by the religious desire to provide housing to 
 
 443. Id. at 14. 
 444. See Allyn, supra note 44. 
 445. 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994); see supra notes 281–85 and accompanying text.  
 446. 642 F. App’x 726 (9th Cir. 2016); see supra notes 293–98 and accompanying text. 
 447. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012). 
 448. No. M2018-00633-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1753053 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2019). 
 449. Id. at *1. 
 450. Id. at *8–9. 
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the poor.451  Since federal policies had shifted away from transitional 
housing, Nashville’s needs were urgent.452  The Tennessee RFRA defines 
substantial burden as state action that “inhibit[s] or curtail[s] religiously 
motivated practice.”453  This definition clearly recognizes and accepts the 
indeterminacy of an affirmative claim.  Applying the factors set out in 
applicable RLUIPA precedent, it was clear that without the 
accommodation this religiously motivated housing could not be built 
without significant cost and delay, that no feasible alternative location 
existed, and that the church had not brought this burden on itself.454  By 
looking at the full context, the court had little difficulty finding a 
substantial burden under the state RFRA.455 
Although RLUIPA and state statutes have offered more robust 
protections for religious land use, disputes over church use of solar 
panels have just started to reach courts.  As noted above, with the 
growing acceptance of alternative energy sources, many churches are 
trying to reduce their carbon footprints as better stewards of the 
environment.456  A new movement to install solar panels on houses of 
worship is gaining traction, with about a thousand congregations having 
done so and organizations like Interfaith Power and Light,457 which has 
chapters in thirty-eight states, encouraging others to do so.458  A 
Unitarian Universalist church situated in a historic district sued the town 
of Bedford, Massachusetts when its commission denied permission to 
install solar panels on its meetinghouse.459  The Church argued that this 
denial violated its right to the free exercise of religion under the state and 
federal constitutions, inter alia.460  The Church contended that the use of 
solar panels was religious conduct because one of the seven principles of 
Unitarian Universalism is “respect for the interdependent web of all 
existence of which we are a part.”461  The Church believed that these 
principles require members “to engage in affirmative acts of 
 
 451. Id. at *6–7. 
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environmental conservation,” which are “essential to their religious 
practice.”462  In keeping with this principle, the Church applied to the 
Unitarian Universalist Association to become a Green Sanctuary church, 
which requires the use of solar panels.463  The Church explained that 
“Unitarian Universalists across the nation believe that their religion 
necessarily involves taking action on a personal, congregational and 
community level to confront and mitigate mankind’s role in causing and 
exacerbating global warming.”464  The Church further claimed that this 
religious conduct did not “disturb[] the public peace” or “obstruct[] the 
religious worship of others,”465 tracking the text of the Massachusetts 
religious freedom provision.466 
The Church lost its religious freedom claim, but prevailed on a 
procedural claim.467  The court found the historic commission’s denial 
facially deficient because the commission failed to explain how the solar 
panels materially interfered with the building’s “historic and iconic 
visage.”468  As to the religious freedom claim, the court found no 
substantial burden to the Church’s religious exercise because the refusal 
to allow solar panels “neither prevented First Parish’s congregants from 
living in accordance with the Seventh Principle of Unitarian 
Universalism nor coerced them to act contrary to that belief.”469  Then, 
like some other courts addressing affirmative claims, the court raised the 
idea that the church had options to address climate change: “[T]hey can 
take other available avenues to achieve a similar result.  For instance, the 
congregants could invest in other renewable forms of energy, local to the 
Meetinghouse or otherwise, or engage in and promote other community 
conservation or recycling efforts.”470  
The question now is whether similar solar energy cases or other 
environmental-based land use claims brought under RLUIPA, or state 
 
 462. Id. at 7. 
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constitutions or statutes, will succeed.  Of course, the answer depends on 
whether courts will focus on the existence of alternatives and how 
“substantial burden,” which varies from circuit to circuit, case by case, is 
defined. 
C. Affirmative Claims on Public Property 
Affirmative claims on private property will not always prevail, but 
private property ownership undoubtedly adds a protective dimension to 
religious exercise.  When church property is used for sanctuary for 
undocumented immigrants, to house the homeless, to provide basic 
human needs, or to protect the environment, the affirmative claim is 
“rooted.”  Constitutional protections of private property and specific 
statutory solicitude in RLUIPA demonstrate the importance of place.  
ICE does not raid houses of worship that offer sanctuary, churches 
routinely offer charitable services without municipal interference, and 
the movement toward solar energy has not hit any major resistance.  
These are not only claims to act in accord with one’s faith but also in 
accord with one’s faith on one’s own property.  However, when religious 
groups exercise their faith affirmatively on public property, the loss of 
this rootedness may have doctrinal consequences. 
1. No Coercion 
As noted above, the tribes in Lyng did not establish a substantial 
burden because they could not meet the threshold requirement of 
coercion.471  Lyng’s rule continues to frustrate Native American land-
based claims.  The Standing Rock protest in North Dakota, which began 
in the spring of 2016 and drew thousands in protest of the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, was one of the biggest progressive religious movements in 
recent history.  The pipeline, intended to carry nearly a half million 
barrels of crude oil through four states each day, was slated to go through 
sacred lands and burial grounds.472  For these reasons, it was viewed as a 
threat to both Native American spiritual life and culture and to the entire 
region’s clean water.473  By the fall of 2016, more than two hundred 
tribes, many environmental groups, and over five hundred clergy and 
 
 471. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988). 
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religious people (representing many Christian denominations and other 
faiths) had joined.474  The protest was also called a “prayer camp,” 
because for many protesters the environmental and religious concerns are 
inextricably connected.475 
In multiple lawsuits, tribes sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
on the grounds that granting permits to the pipeline, which bordered 
tribal reservations, violated a slew of federal statutes.476  They argued 
that preparing the land for construction would jeopardize historically and 
culturally significant sites and that the Corps had not adequately 
considered environmental impacts.477  Significant for this Article, they 
also invoked RFRA to claim that the pipeline endangered the religious 
exercise of tribal members.478 
By early 2017, only twenty miles of pipeline remained unfinished.  
The Army Corps of Engineers still had to grant an easement for pipeline 
construction through the lakebed of Lake Oahe, which is a federally 
regulated waterway forming part of the Missouri River.479  Fresh from 
inauguration, Trump reversed a recent Obama administration decision to 
consider alternatives, and ordered an expedited approval process.480  The 
easement was quickly granted in February, and one day later the 
Cheyenne River Tribe sought a preliminary injunction to block it on the 
grounds that the construction of the pipeline would interfere with its 
religious exercise.481  In Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, the tribe claimed: 
 The Lakota people believe that the mere existence of a crude oil 
pipeline under the waters of Lake Oahe will desecrate those waters and 
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render them unsuitable for use in their religious sacraments.  The 
Lakota people believe that the pipeline correlates with the terrible 
Black Snake prophesied to come into the Lakota homeland and cause 
destruction.  The Lakota believe that the very existence of the Black 
Snake under their sacred waters in Lake Oahe will unbalance and 
desecrate the water and render it impossible for the Lakota to use that 
water in their Inipi ceremony.482  
Because their water-based religious ceremonies require ritually pure 
water, the tribe claimed a RFRA violation.483 
The district court held that the tribe did not demonstrate a likelihood 
of success on the merits of the RFRA claim and denied the motion for a 
preliminary injunction.484  Although the court accepted that the Black 
Snake beliefs were sincere, the pipeline construction created no 
“substantial burden” on the tribe members’ religious practice.485  The 
grant of the pipeline easement “does not impose a sanction on [t]ribe’s 
members for exercising their religious beliefs, nor does it pressure them 
to choose between religious exercise and the receipt of government 
benefits.”486  In other words, it failed to meet Lyng’s coercion 
requirement.487 
The court acknowledged that the government action––the grant of 
the easement for the pipeline in the lakebed––would desecrate a sacred 
site and prevent the performance of religious sacraments.488  But it found 
this impact incidental and noncoercive.489  While the tribe may believe it 
cannot use the water for their ceremonies when oil flows through the 
pipeline, “there is no specific ban on their religious exercise, nor does 
performance of their sacraments trigger a sanction, loss of government 
benefit, or other collateral harm.”490  Thus, the D.C. Circuit explained, 
“[j]ust as the government’s tree cutting and road building in Lyng did not 
give rise to an actionable Free Exercise claim, neither does its easement 
granting here likely violate RFRA.”491 
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This outcome turned on federal ownership of the sacred land: no 
burden on religion could be established when the land through which the 
road was built in Lyng and the land beneath the sacred waters in Standing 
Rock was public land.492  Where Native Americans own their own land, 
they can look to RLUIPA for protection.493 
Despite the hopeful scholarly suggestions that RFRA can offer 
robust protection for Native American religious claims,494 the coercion 
prerequisite remains for now a formidable obstacle.  The district court in 
Standing Rock found that recent decisions did not affect Lyng’s coercion 
requirement, which applies to both constitutional and statutory free 
exercise.495  It also found that plaintiffs in both Hobby Lobby and Holt 
suffered coercion, as each was forced to choose between violating their 
beliefs and facing penalties, either financial or disciplinary.496  Native 
American claims on federally owned land are typically not cognizable, 
despite the severity of any burdens, although one district court has held 
otherwise.497  Broadly speaking, when your sacred space encompasses 
land owned by another—especially land owned by the government—it is 
well-nigh impossible to show that your free exercise rights were violated. 
As to the numerous other claims in the Standing Rock litigation, the 
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2. The Existence of Alternatives 
While skeptical courts may make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
establish a substantial burden when the religious actor brings an 
affirmative claim but had an option that involved no conflict with the 
law, refusal claims typically do not admit of options.  Refusing to do 
what the law commands results in automatic penalties, so there is a tight 
fit between the legal and religious conflict.  Indeed, note how Hobby 
Lobby details the lack of options in the substantial burden discussion: “If 
the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be 
facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very 
heavy price [in penalties].”500  The mandate “demands that they engage 
in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”501  If they don’t 
meet these demands, severe financial penalties follow.502  If they provide 
coverage in accordance with their religion, they suffer massive fines.503  
The Court rejected the suggestion that the companies had the option of 
dropping coverage altogether, for that also entailed substantial financial 
penalties and could create a competitive disadvantage.504  In short, 
refusal claims show that the religious actor is in a box. 
In contrast, affirmative claims are amenable to the existence of 
alternatives, which can affect the free exercise analysis.  Two recent 
magistrate judge decisions demonstrate the vulnerabilities of affirmative 
claims when alternatives exist.505  In both cases, the magistrate judges 
were substantial-burden skeptics, ruling against protesters and 
humanitarian aid volunteers.506  Wisely, both determinations were 
overturned by federal district court judges who found a substantial 
burden under RFRA.507  The analysis of those magistrate decisions 
remains instructive as an illustration of the ease with which alternatives 
can thwart the finding of burden if a court is inclined toward skepticism. 
In April of 2018, after two years of prayer, seven members of the 
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Plowshares Movement, all Catholics, illegally cut through locks and 
entered high security areas of Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay in 
Georgia to spray paint antinuclear protest messages, pour blood, hammer 
statues of missiles, unfurl banners, and pray in an act of “nonviolent 
symbolic disarmament.”508  Plowshares is a Christian pacifist groups 
founded in 1980 to oppose nuclear weapons.  They believe that the 
government’s Trident missile program is a war crime that threatens the 
existence of all of humanity.509  The government charged each of the 
seven members with three felonies and one misdemeanor, including 
trespass, destruction of government property, and conspiracy.510  In 
United States v. Kelly, the magistrate judge denied the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss the charges on RFRA grounds, inter alia.511 
The defendants argued that they refused to be complicit through 
inaction, which compelled them to “preach the gospel of nonviolence” to 
the military and to protest the threat to humanity.512  The defendants 
engaged in nonviolent symbolic disarmament to re-consecrate the very 
land that has been desecrated by the presence of nuclear missiles.513 
A theologian and a bishop served as expert witnesses, describing 
how Catholic social teaching supports an understanding of the 
defendants’ actions as prophetic and sacramental,  how Catholics must 
answer for complicity in social injustice and so need to act, based on 
conscience, and how the immorality of nuclear weapons has long been a 
topic of Christian and specifically Catholic ethics.514  Of importance to 
these experts was that the lawbreaking was nonviolent resistance,515 in 
the tradition of Martin Luther King, Jr.  It was prophetic in that one 
violates unjust laws in order to transform them.516  And it was 
sacramental because one resists at a particular physical location—here, 
the land desecrated by missiles—in order to reclaim and reconsecrate 
that space.517 
The federal magistrate judge made clear that in order to demonstrate 
a substantial burden under RFRA, one must show that the government 
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places “significant pressure” on a person to violate a sincerely held 
religious belief.518  He noted that the substantial burden inquiry has both 
a subjective and objective part, with the former deferring to the religious 
sensibilities of the claimant, but the latter asking the hard question: 
whether the law or policy “directly conflicts with the religious conduct 
and, if so, whether the pressure the law exerts is substantial.”519  In other 
words, the law must “directly put [the] [d]efendants in a choice to break 
the law or abstain from their religiously required practice.”520 
The defendants argued that indeed they were put to the choice to 
break the law (i.e., entering the base illegally to engage in nonviolent 
symbolic disarmament) or abstaining from this religious practice (i.e., 
being complicit in a grave injustice against humanity).521  But the 
magistrate judge saw it differently.  He found that the defendants had 
failed to show a direct conflict between the religious conduct and the 
laws of trespass, injury to government property, or conspiracy.522  They 
were not put to a direct choice between following those laws or their 
faith because they had options.523  In the magistrate judge’s view, the 
defendants could have asked for and received permission to enter the 
location (as some other religious groups had done) or they could have 
protested at an alternative, less secure location on the base.524  The 
Plowshares Seven did not demonstrate “a sincere religious belief that 
required them to engage in [their protest] activities without permission or 
on portions of the facility behind the perimeter fence line.”525  They 
failed to show that their beliefs required them to cut locks and fences to 
access the secure portion of the base.526  Thus, they could have engaged 
 
 518. Id. at *23 (citations omitted). 
 519. Id. at *23–24 (citations omitted). 
 520. Id. at *29. 
 521. Id. at *15. 
 522. Id. at *25.  The magistrate judge defined a direct conflict between law and faith in very 
narrow terms, making it impossible for the defendants to meet the burden and completely 
neutralizing the religious-moral action.  The court defined government action not as the maintenance 
of the missile program but instead the specific laws under which defendants are charged, such as 
trespass.  Id.  Further, the court defined religious exercise in terms of what one’s religion requires.  
Id.  Of course, the protesters could not demonstrate that their faith required them to trespass and 
destroy government property to gain access specifically to the high security areas.  See id.  The end 
was not to gain access but to engage in symbolic disarmament right on desecrated land.  Id. at *3–4. 
 523. Id. at *25–26, *29. 
 524. Id.  
 525. Id. at *25. 
 526. Id. at *26.  RFRA protects religiously motivated exercise.  Id. at *20.  Under RFRA, 
“religious exercise” explicitly includes “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or 
central to, a system of religious belief.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (2012) (emphasis added) (citing § 
2000cc-5(7)(A)). 
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in their symbolic disarmament at another location on the base, outside 
the secured perimeter.527  Given the existence of these lawful options, 
“there is no direct conflict between their religious exercise and the 
criminal statutes under which they are charged, and thus, no substantial 
burden exists.”528  Wisely, the federal district court rejected this 
analysis.529  Though it still ruled against the protesters because of the 
government’s interest in the security of its bases, the district court found 
that defendants had indeed been substantially burdened in the exercise of 
their religion.530 
Like the magistrate judge’s analysis in Dr. Warren’s case, the 
magistrate judge in United States v. Kelly treated an affirmative claim by 
the standards applicable to refusal claims.  As explained above, refusal 
claims are generated by what the law requires while affirmative claims 
are determined by what the religion teaches.  A refusal claim is a direct 
attack on the law.  It is unremarkable that the Plowshares Seven had no 
direct objection to trespass law.  An affirmative claim is structured 
differently, as it is based primarily upon the religious party’s decision to 
act—on the basis of a theological determination as to how one 
inculturates a broader religious command in a particular time, place, and 
circumstance.  A court treating an affirmative claim like a refusal claim 
will look for a narrow and specific tenet that tells the claimant to violate 
the law.  The court will not find it.  Yet even though affirmative and 
refusal claims arise from different faith-law interactions, the conflict 
between faith and law for affirmative claims is no less direct than for 
refusal claims. 
In October 2019, the Plowshares Seven were found guilty of three 
felonies and one misdemeanor each, including conspiracy, trespassing 
 
 527. Untied States v. Kelly, No. CR 2:18-022, 2019 WL 5077546, at *26 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 
2019). 
 528. Id.  The trespass and destruction of property were only a means to getting to the base to 
perform symbolic disarmament, but it could have been done without breaking those laws.  See id.  
The magistrate judge went on to analyze the compelling governmental interest and least restrictive 
purpose prongs, even though no substantial burden was demonstrated.  Id.  He found that the 
government established a compelling interest in protecting its property, prohibiting unauthorized 
entry, and ensuring the security of the base and its personnel.  Id. at *27–28.  He further determined 
that the government demonstrated that no alternative means existed for achieving its goals without 
imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.  Id. at *29.  When the defendants offered 
“permitted protest” as the least restrictive alternative, the magistrate judge noted that just such an 
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 529. The court refused to “look at whether Defendants could have exercised their religion 
outside the perimeter fence . . . or whether they could have asked for authorization.”  Kelly, 2019 
WL 4017424, at *4. 
 530. Id. at *4, *7. 
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and defacing government property.531  They face up to twenty-five years 
in prison.532 
A similar concern about alternatives colored the magistrate judge’s 
analysis in United States v. Hoffman.533  Volunteers with No More 
Deaths, the desert ministry of Tucson Unitarian Church mentioned above 
in connection with Dr. Scott Warren’s humanitarian work at the Barn, 
took substantial risks to venture into the desert, a national wildlife 
refuge, to leave water and food for undocumented border crossers.534  
Federal agents destroyed the No More Deaths provisions they found.535  
In early 2019, four volunteers—Natalie Hoffman and three others—were 
convicted of misdemeanors for entering the refuge without a permit and 
for leaving supplies, violations of federal law.536 
The magistrate judge rejected the volunteers’ RFRA defense in part 
because he considered their beliefs to be political, rather than religious.537  
Further, he concluded that limited access to the refuge caused no 
substantial burden on their religious exercise.538  Perhaps the magistrate 
judge was thinking about the No More Deaths volunteers like the other 
magistrate judges had thought about Dr. Warren and about the 
Plowshares Seven: they had options to satisfy their religious thirst for 
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justice in other, legal ways.539  Indeed, DOJ attorneys in Hoffman had 
argued, “There are many methods for providing aid in the [refuge], some 
of which do not violate the rules and regulations, and the defendants’ 
preference for one method over another cannot create a substantial 
burden.”540 
In overturning the magistrate judge, the federal district court in 
Hoffman found that the volunteers were indeed engaged in religious 
exercise.541  Like the Kelly court, the Hoffman court rejected the 
magistrate judge’s finding of no substantial burden under RFRA.542  But 
unlike Kelly, the Hoffman court reversed the volunteers’ convictions: the 
government failed to make its showing under the compelling interest and 
least restrictive alternative prongs of RFRA.543  As to the significance of 
alternatives, the court rejected the DOJ’s argument that the volunteers 
had “other locations available for them to place their cache of 
supplies.”544 
The impact of the RFRA analysis in Kelly and Hoffman in other 
contexts remains to be seen.  Other groups venture onto public property 
to exercise their faith, but often without much protection unless they can 
invoke constitutional protections for expressive rights.545  Activists 
recently filed a complaint challenging Houston’s anti-food-sharing law, 
which made it illegal to serve meals on public or private property to 
more than five homeless people without consent.546  The organization 
known as Food Not Bombs engages in peaceful political action to spread 
its message that poverty and hunger can be eliminated by redirecting 
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military spending.547  One of its members, Ailene Adams, is a Christian 
with “a sincere religious belief that sharing, receiving and giving food to 
others . . . is part of what her religion encourages her to do.”548  Citing to 
numerous passages of the Bible, Ms. Adams claims that the anti-sharing 
law infringes on her “deeply held belief as a  Christian” to share food 
with more than five persons at a time outdoors without first seeking 
municipal permission.549  The outcome remains unclear even given the 
explicit reliance on the religious nature, and not merely the expressive 
nature, of the conduct.550 
V. CONCLUSION 
When religious progressives challenge laws, they also challenge the 
entrenched and polarized narratives of religious conservatives and 
secular liberals.  Some of the current litigants may even challenge the 
more restrained free exercise approach of many religious liberals.  They 
show us that religious freedom is broader than the protection of 
conservative causes and reveal the current administration’s grand 
commitment to broad religious liberty as a commitment primarily to 
conservative causes. 
This Article observed that while religious exercise is capable of 
generating conflicts that span the partisan divide, most present-day 
conservative religious claims take the form of refusals to comply with 
law, while most liberal religious claims are affirmative—that is, more 
fluid, indeterminate, contextualized, and discretionary.  For such claims, 
it may be difficult to establish a substantial burden to one’s free exercise 
either because coercion is lacking or alternative ways of exercising 
religion exist, or because religious exercise takes place on public 
property.  These observations are not intended to suggest that religious 
liberals should organize to out-compete conservatives.  Instead, this 
Article observes that the presence of progressive litigants now in the free 
exercise space begins to challenge the entrenched conservative and 
liberal narratives regarding the meaning and scope of religious freedom 
and offers a different set of moral concerns for public discourse.  It 
challenges the narrow conception of rule-based religion with claims that 
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often involve religious indeterminacy.  It reminds us that progressives, 
like traditionalists, can find themselves out of step with majority norms 
and dependent upon the continued salience and endurance of private 
institutional and associational freedoms.  It forces a reconsideration of 
the notion of complicity, which has been tied so closely to the 
conservative narrative.  For these reasons, progressive religious 
claimants can contribute significantly to an ever-evolving political and 
juridical compromise among multiple religious freedom narratives. 
 
